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Abstract 
How can one think of the possibility of emergence of democracy in non-Western countries? Such an idea 
had been approached in pessimism for a long time in academia. This is because the conditions deemed 
indispensable for democratic development (such as high rates of urbanization and literacy) rarely existed 
in those countries. Thus, the concept “Western democracy” was considered an oxymoron, since, according 
to earlier scholars of democracy, only Western polities could meet the conditions/prerequisites for the 
genesis of democracy. Nevertheless, this long-held prophecy was challenged as non-Western countries 
demonstrated significant progress towards establishing a democratic rule, despite having “so-called” 
unfavorable conditions (such as religion or poor economic performance) to democratic development. 
Despite this global resurgence of democratic governance, the countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
were never able to develop a democratic rule, a situation that has long been explained by pointing at the 
“exceptional” characteristics (primarily Islam) inherent in the region. Yet, the events that began on 
December 17, 2010 in Tunisia opened up the possibility for the countries that had been long-ruled by 
autocrats to embark on a democratic transition. The uprisings that eventually unseated longtime 
authoritarian rulers (only occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya) enabled divergent socio-political 
forces to become involved in transitional processes in the aftermath of regime breakdowns. However, only 
the first two cases had meaningful steps that were taken towards sustaining the transition. This research has 
been built on the argument that four key factors have played important roles in transitional processes of 
these two cases, namely Tunisia (the transition to a democratic governance) and Egypt (the restoration of a 
new form of authoritarianism): the formation of the state, pact-making compromises among revolutionary 
actors, moderation of religious parties, and civil society activism. In addition to explaining the divergence 
in these two countries’ transitional processes, this research has been written in response to the prolonged 
pessimism that the regimes in the region are destined to stay non-democratic.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The claim that democracy or a democratic form of governance would not grow in Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) has long been commonplace, especially in the Western 
scholarship. Embedded political framework, historical background, institutional legacy, and 
cultural baggages are believed to account for the failure or inadequacy to establish an 
accountable and functioning political system in the region. Given the data provided by Freedom 
House annually, none of the political systems in the region was considered “free” before 2010. 
However, the Arab Spring unfolded a new political phase.  December 17, 2010 marked a critical 
moment in Arab political history, variously labeled by many regional and international observers 
as “Arab Awakening,” “Arab Uprisings,” or “Arab Spring.” Intrinsically, it promised to redefine 
the relationship between the ruled and the ruler in the countries in which it occurred.  
 One of the major questions that the Arab Uprisings raised was to what extent the 
countries shaken by the uprisings could transform their authoritarian political system into a 
democratic structure. There is a rich scholarly literature indicating that transitional processes are 
complex and that authoritarian regimes equip themselves with various tools (repression through 
security apparatus or co-optation of the opposition figures) in order to maintain the status-quo.1 
They help us understand why a democratic transformation is hardly to occur in the region. 
However, there is one case telling a different story for almost six years: Tunisia. The Economist 
magazine indicated Tunisia as the country of 2015: “The idealism engendered by the Arab spring 
has mostly sunk in bloodshed and extremism, with a shining exception: Tunisia…Its economy is 
                                                          
1 Jason Brownlee, “Political Crisis and Restabilization: Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia,” in Marsha Pripstein 
Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist (eds.), Authoritarianism in The Middle East: Regimes and Resistance 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005): 47-48; see also Eva Bellin, “Coercive Institutions and Coercive 
Leaders,” in Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michele Penner Angrist (eds.), Authoritarianism in The Middle East: 
Regimes and Resistance (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005): 24. 
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struggling and its polity is fragile; but Tunisia’s pragmatism and moderation have nurtured hope 
in a wretched region and a troubled world. Mabrouk, Tunisia!”2 As in Tunisia, the long-time 
autocrat was deposed in Egypt in 2011, which raised the hopes for a political change. Yet, since 
the mid-2013, when the military ousted the country’s first civilian president with the support of 
millions of Egyptians, Egypt’s political landscape gradually has reverted to “the same old story.” 
As Dina Rashed wrote in 2016, “Five years later, the relationship between citizens and the police 
remains uneasy. Despite some early attempts at reform, abusive practices have returned and the 
state’s institution of law and order is shaky.”3   
The prospect of a democratic transition in the Arab world, where none of the waves of 
democratization (one beginning in the 1820s, one after the World War II, and one throughout the 
70s and 80s) reached, is worth considering. The main question of this thesis is: how does a 
country in which authoritarianism prevailed for so long realize its transition towards 
democratization? Is a “way out” possible, and if so, how? Tunisia and Egypt provide instructive 
examples to address these questions. In essence, a comparative analysis of the challenges of 
democratization by examining both cases will show the blueprint of this “way out.” 
Defining Concepts 
 Before attempting to examine whether democratization is likely in MENA, it is necessary 
to define the key concepts that will be used throughout the research. Democratic transition and 
democratization are the two key concepts to which I will refer interchangeably throughout this 
thesis, largely because the focus of this research is how an undemocratic regime is replaced with 
a relatively democratic one in which civilians govern and are held accountable for their policies. 
                                                          
2 “Hope Springs,” The Economist, December 20, 2014, as quoted in Shelly Culbertson, The Fires of Spring: A Post- 
Arab Spring Journey the Turbulent New Middle East (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2016): 16. 
3 Dina Rashed, “What has changed in the five years since Egypt’s police sparked a revolution — and what hasn’t,” 
POMEPS Studies 18, March 2016: 9. 
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In other words, my focus is how to make a genuine break from authoritarian past or at least how 
to establish an electoral democracy in countries that are long ruled by autocrats. Over the years 
of research on democratic transition, scholars have approached it from different angles, each 
shedding light on particular aspects of democratic transition. Some scholars conceptualize 
democratic transition or democratization as simply a “replacement” of an undemocratic political 
system with a relatively more democratic one.4 Others, with whom I agree, see it as a “process” 
of making an undemocratic system a more democratic one. Within this tradition, Guillermo 
O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986) define democratic transition as an “interval” 
between “the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime” and “the 
installation of some form of democracy.”5 Besides, it would be a mistake to equate 
democratization with a mere electoralism in which the seemingly free elections occur after the 
authoritarian regime breaks down, but the shadow of the actors or institutions of the old regime 
continue to be felt by the revolutionary civilians.6 With this in mind, I consider the following 
situation as the failure of democratic transition: an undemocratic regime is overthrown (the 
beginning of democratic opening) but then a variant of it reemerges with different actors. 
Sometimes, the remnants of the old regime (the military, judiciary, or the leading figures from 
the old regime) do not wish to install an accountable and better-functioning system after the 
longtime autocrat steps down, largely because of less “rewarding” conditions of such a new 
system. In this case, they intervene in the transitional process and narrow the realm of civilian 
authority, which I consider the failure of the transition.  
                                                          
4 Patrick Bernhagen, “Measuring Democracy and Democratization,” in Christian W. Haerpfer, Patrick Bernhagen, 
Ronald F. Inglehart, and Christian Welzel (eds.), Democratization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 25. 
5 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986): 6. 
6 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996): XIII, 3-7. 
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Methodology 
Essentially, this study is based on a qualitative analysis, focusing primarily on an 
extensive literature review of democratization processes in countries going through the 
transitions.7 It will take a comparative approach in investigating the prospects and pitfalls of the 
democratic transition processes. The Arab Spring, as a whole, provides a significant study area to 
observe the process of “moving away” from authoritarianism as well as the transitional 
challenges while tipping towards democracy. In examining this issue, a case study method will 
be used. By closely investigating each country in which the Arab Spring had broken out, I aimed 
to find cases that are comparable in terms of sharing a similar socio-economic and political 
framework. Apart from publicly accessible primary sources such as interviews and statements of 
the leading political actors responsible for overseeing their countries’ transitions, I largely rely 
on secondary sources such as articles, books, and reports written on the Arab Spring and the 
country-specific trajectories in its aftermath. 
Outline of the Study 
 Chapter I provides an overview of the Arab uprisings and its place in the studies of 
democratization. It also provides a literature review discussing the prospects and pitfalls of a 
transitional period. It suggests that post-revolutionary politics is more prone to transforming back 
to the old authoritarian regime than holding on to democratization process. As will be shown, a 
                                                          
7 Some of the most notable works are Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds, The Arab Spring: 
Pathways of Repression and Reform (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); Justin Frosini, 
Francesco Biagi, Duncan Pickard, and Nathan J. Brown (eds.), Political and Constitutional Transitions in North 
Africa (New York: Routledge, 2015); Alfred Stepan and Juan J Linz, “Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab 
Spring’,”Journal of Democracy 24 (2), 2013; Amel Ahmed and Giovanni Capoccia, “The Study of Democratization 
and the Arab Spring,” Middle East Law and Governance 6, 2014; O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986); Linz and Stepan 
(1996); see also Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1990). 
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sound democratic transition requires a set of factors that could keep a country in the transitional 
path, using the cases of Tunisia and Egypt to trace the importance of these factors. 
Chapter II and III are organized similarly. They will be devoted to historical backgrounds 
of the uprisings specific to each case, Tunisia and Egypt. Events that began in Tunisia on 
December 17, 2010 have encouraged scholars to revisit the existing scholarship of the 
“resiliency” of authoritarianism in the region. Post-Arab Spring process has shown that 
authoritarian regimes can re-stabilize themselves or adapt to differing conditions in various 
ways. I will first trace the mechanisms/determinants sparking the mass revolts and demands to 
which they gave rise and then how political elites oversaw the transitional period in both 
countries.  
Chapter IV is the core of this study, propounding a multifaceted approach that combines 
differing analytical foci together into a complex but coherent synthesis. It will suggest that there 
are four significant factors that determine whether a country makes a successful transition to 
democracy or transforms back to authoritarianism. First, I will examine the formation of the state 
in MENA, focusing specifically on the civil-military relations and its impact on a country’s 
democratic transition. This is largely because the regimes in MENA are often structured around 
the governments’ security apparatus. Transitional processes are likely to be slowed down (or 
hindered under differing conditions) when the ouster of the autocrat leaves the political 
landscape to the remnants of the old regime. For this reason, the military officers are highly 
likely to play a proactive role during transitional process as arbiters in order to maintain their 
current political ambitions, and if possible, to enhance their institutional autonomy at the expense 
of civilian authority. Thus, I will argue that the prospect of democratization is in part bound by 
the extent to which the military establishment is historically (de)politicized. Second, I will 
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examine the role of agency (with an actor-centered focus) with regard to power-sharing 
compromises among political elites in the transitional process. Islamist parties in Tunisia and 
Egypt received the majority of votes in the first democratic elections, but the way they channeled 
this support into resolving the problems of transitional process differed significantly in the two 
cases under study. Third, I will analyze the relationship between the moderation of Islamist 
parties in both cases and its impact on these countries’ democratic transitions. I will argue that 
the degree to which Islamist parties that came to power in the aftermath of the uprisings had put 
aside the core/ontological elements of their ideologies over time is pivotal to explaining the 
divergence in the transitional outcomes. Finally, I will examine the role that civil society plays in 
democratic transitions and how civil-society groups contributed to political transitions in the 
cases of Tunisia and Egypt.  
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CHAPTER I 
1.1. Democratization: How and Where is It Possible? 
Is it possible for countries in which non-democratic governance has prevailed for so long 
to democratize their political systems? Are the regimes in non-Western countries destined to stay 
authoritarian as suggested by a number of prominent scholars? Or is it not too late to hope for a 
democratic transformation in regions like Middle East and North Africa if certain factors and 
elements are present during a transition from authoritarianism?  
How a democracy comes about has been an important question, and answers given to it 
vary. While some scholars concentrate on the “prerequisites”1 for the existence of democracy in 
a given country, others approach democracy as an eventual destination into which a regime 
naturally evolves through some political developments.2 Robert Dahl, whose writings have long 
shaped the study of democracy, suggested that appropriate requirements for democracy are 
invented and reinvented at different times and in different places (without being too strict about 
where it can emerge).3  
Early explanations (modernization theory) of how democracy comes about begins with 
the assumption that countries follow or go through a number of similar processes, such as 
urbanization, industrialization, high level of education, and increasing national income. 
Therefore, democracy can take roots in a society if these grand processes are already in play.4 As 
Lipset pointed out: 
                                                          
1 Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy,” The American Political Science Review 53 (1), 1959.  
2 Samuel P. Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?” Political Science Quarterly 99 (2), 1984: 198-
214; see also Ahmed and Capoccia (2014): 19. 
3 Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2000): 9. 
4 Jan Teorell, Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010): 17. 
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One must be able to point to a set of conditions that have actually existed in a number of countries, 
and say: democracy has emerged out of these conditions, and has become stabilized because of 
certain supporting institutions and values, as well as because of its own internal self-maintaining 
processes.5 
In addition, the localization of democracy or democratic norms became a common theme 
in the earlier explanations of where it develops. According to these explanations, the conditions 
that favor democracy are geographically uniform and hard to diffuse where they are weak or 
absent. According to some, only in the countries of northwest Europe and their English-speaking 
colonies could democracy develop due to a historically unique presence of such conditions such 
as capitalist economic development and the existence of bourgeois class.6 This approach deems 
the prospect of democratization in the non-Western or non-English speaking cultures limited, if 
not impossible.  
Considering the non-Western societies, cultural arguments revolving around religion 
have dominated the discussions of why some can possess democratic norms but not the others. 
Religion has long been blamed for less support for the development of democracy. Catholicism, 
Orthodox Christianity, Confucianism, and Islam were believed to have certain characteristics 
that negatively affect the prospect for the establishment of democratic governance. Protestanism 
is often differed from these four religious understandings. For, in Lipset’s argument, “these 
differences have been explained by (1) the much greater emphasis on individualism in 
Protestantism and (2) the traditionally close links between religion and the state in other four 
religions.”7 Nevertheless, if the problem is embedded in religion, what then explains 
democratization of Indonesia, where Islam is the dominant religion? Similarly, Confucianism 
                                                          
5 Lipset (1959): 69. 
6 Lipset (1959): 85. 
7 Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address,” American 
Sociology Review 59 (1), 1994: 5. 
9 
 
was deemed the main obstacle for the development of democratic institutions in East Asia in the 
1980s, but then democratizations of South Korea and Taiwan followed. Therefore, as stated by 
Teorell, “religious obstacles to democratization have been cited before only to be disproved by 
history at a later time point.”8 
In his widely cited article, Samuel Huntington claimed that democratic norms can only 
flourish and be well-instituted in Western culture, drawing the academic attention to Muslim 
populated/Middle East and North Africa countries to have cultures that are hostile to 
democracy.9 Elli Kedourie is another scholar, who agrees with Huntington on the incompatibility 
between cultural norms in Muslim countries and the genesis of democracy. He wrote: 
There is nothing in the political traditions of the Arab world—which are the political traditions of 
Islam—which might make familiar or indeed intelligible, the organizing ideas of constitutional 
and representative government. The notion of the state as a specific territorial entity which is 
endowed with sovereignty, the notion of popular sovereignty as the foundation of governmental 
legitimacy, the idea of representation, of elections, or popular suffrage, of political institutions 
being regulated by laws laid down by a parliamentary assembly, of these laws being guarded and 
upheld by an independent judiciary, the ideas of the secularity of the state, of society being 
composed of a multitude of self-activating, autonomous groups and associations—all these are 
profoundly alien to the Muslim political tradition.10 
Others, like Shadi Hamid, propound that Islam as a religion and as an idea “poses” a 
“vexing” problem for the “modern nation state,” suggesting that its “never-changing” character 
can hardly adapt to contemporary politics.11 Yet, “democracy is alien to the mind-set of Islam” is 
an essentialist argument, as Hinnebusch (2006) has pointed out, because it ignores the fact that 
Islam “varies too widely by context and time” to generate an unfriendly environment for 
                                                          
8 Teorell (2010): 50. 
9 Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave,” Journal of Democracy 2 (2), 1991: 22-23. 
10 Elie Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, 1992): 6. 
11 Shadi Hamid, Islamic Exceptionalism: How the Struggle Over Islam Is Reshaping the World (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2016). 
10 
 
democratization to emerge.12 In general, those who have long explained the continuity of 
authoritarianism in the region by pointing at the religion of Islam often hold a narrow and 
deterministic approach towards the presumed incompatibility of Islam and democracy. I think it 
is more likely that authoritarian persistence in the region is rooted primarily in the poor 
governance and the absence of strong institutions instead of the presence of certain cultural 
characteristics.13 An appropriate explanation of the resilience of authoritarianism is noted by 
Anthony Cordesman, who has argued that the continuity of authoritarianism in the region “lies in 
the fact that many Middle Eastern states have no enemy greater than their own governments.”14 
Cultural arguments may be explanatory in understanding the longevity of “democratic 
consolidation” processes as the democratic norms and values become gradually integrated into 
the newly democratizing political system, but not necessarily in explaining “democratic opening” 
per se.15  
Moreover, claiming that “an authoritarian regime will be transformed into a democratic 
one if some conditions already exist in this regime” reflects a single-factor causality. Dankwart 
Rustow argued against this issue in his well-known article, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a 
Dynamic Model.” His article suggested that earlier assumptions connecting the existence of 
                                                          
12 Raymond Hinnebusch, “Authoritarian persistence, democratization theory and the Middle East: An overview and 
critique,” Democratization 13 (3), 2006: 375. 
13 For an excellent analysis on the underlying factor that determines the success or failure of a political system, see 
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New 
York: Crown Business, 2012). For Acemoglu and Robinson, the indicators such as “geographical misfortune,” 
“cultural baggage,” or “external exploitation,” elements long deemed vital to establish a successful political system, 
are instead of less importance in comparison to “institutionalization.”  
14 Anthony Cordesman, “Transitions in the Middle East: An Address to the 8th U.S. Mideast Policymakers 
Conference,” September 9, 1999, as quoted in Lisa Anderson, “Arab Democracy: Dismal Prospects,” World Policy 
Journal 18 (3), 2001: 54. Along the same lines, Larry Diamond wrote, “the obstacle to democracy in the Middle 
East is not the culture, or the religion of Islam, or the society, but rather the regimes themselves,” see Larry 
Diamond, The Struggle of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout The World (New York: 
Holt Paperbacks, 2008): 277. 
15 Mehran Kamrava, “The Middle East’s Democracy Deficit in Comparative Perspective,” PGDT 6, 2007: 196-197. 
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democracy with particular preconditions such as per capita income, widespread literacy, and 
commonality of the urban residence should be revisited. Indeed, they falsely presume that the 
same “footsteps” must be followed or sought after in every country on the verge of a democratic 
transformation. Actually, these “procedural requisites” do not always coincide; it is normal that 
some polities might meet some of these conditions that others might not. In addition, even when 
some of these requisites are already in play, it is still unlikely that they would gradually lead to a 
democratic opening under an authoritarian regime. Take civil society for example. It is often said 
that civil society activism would compel authoritarian leaders to be more tolerant of the 
democratic demands of the public. Yet, the problem with this argument is that it ignores the 
coercive apparatus of authoritarian regime. The autocrats do not hesitate to resort to force against 
their citizens when they calculate the survival of their regime is at stake. Thus, the development 
of civil society does not necessarily open the door to a democratic regime. Nevertheless, once the 
regime collapses, civil society might begin playing a bridging role among political elites in 
pushing them to take a more consensual stance towards each other, which is essential to the 
consolidation of the transitional process. 
Furthermore, Rustow pointed out that “the genesis” of democracy does not have to be 
geographically, temporally, and socially uniform; on the contrary, there may be many roads in 
order democracy to come about.16 He suggested that a regime would better manage its 
democratization process not by “copying” the experiences of other countries, but rather by 
realizing the sui generis challenges facing the transition at the time and by adopting applicable 
and effective practices for the prospect of the transitional process.17 Rustow also makes a 
                                                          
16 Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2 (3), 1970: 
346. 
17 Rustow (1970): 354. 
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conceptual difference between “democracy” and “democratic transitions” when he criticizes 
earlier approaches for usually lumping these two concepts together. He emphasizes that the 
latter’s alleged promises such as “better economy” or “high literacy rates” should be examined 
separately when we examine democratic transitions. He famously wrote, “the factors that keep a 
democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into existence; explanations of democracy 
must distinguish between function and genesis.”18 
Furthermore, decades-old experiences of democratization in different geographic regions 
across the globe can be considered as a significant indicator, manifesting various paths and cases 
of transitions. In 1973, Freedom House considered only 29 percent of the countries “free,” 28 
percent “partly free,” and 43 percent as “not free.”19 In 2016, the percentage of free countries 
went up to 40 percent, 24 percent were partly free, and 36 percent were not free.20 Considering 
this significant political transformation across the globe, it would be difficult to assert that there 
is a “transition paradigm” that would explain all these democratization experiences.21  
The more plausible way to examine a transition should begin with the acknowledgement 
that transitions do not show linear and fixed patterns. Going back to Lipset’s deterministic 
approach that lays down peculiar “ground rules” for a democracy to emerge, he suggested a 
polity must already meet certain requisites of economic development, such as wealth and 
                                                          
18 Rustow (1970): 346. 
19 Laurel E. Miller et al., “Democratization in the Arab World: Prospects and Lessons from Around the Globe,” 
RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2012: XVII. 
20 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 Report. 
21 Some scholars argue against maximalist approaches overlooking differing experiences of regime change in 
different parts of the globe. For example, Michael McFaul criticizes Huntington’s three waves of democratization 
theory in terms of its practicality to understand regime changes in post-communist countries, suggesting that the 
outcomes of transitional experiences in post-communist countries need to be grouped into a new “fourth wave” as 
they had eventuated in both democratic and dictatorial forms of governance. For a detailed analysis, see Michael 
McFaul, “The Fourth wave of democracy and dictatorship: Non-cooperative transitions in the post-Communist 
world,” World Politics 54 (2), 2002.  
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education, so then democracy can emerge.22 However, the determinism embedded in his 
argument is bound to fail due to their ambiguity of identifying “technically” at what point 
authoritarianism ceases and democracy emerges.23 Prophecies of modernization theory have 
failed explaining, for example, why India, where the rates of poverty and illiteracy are still 
relatively high,24 has consolidated its democracy; or how Mali, a poor and democratically 
inexperienced country, was recognized as “free” by Freedom House in 2011.25 Likewise, Latin 
American transitions during 1978-2000 period showed that the overall relationship between 
democracy and economic development is not always clear as promised. Within this period, only 
four successful cases of democracy emerged: Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela, and the 
Dominican Republic, though the most prosperous countries in the region during this period were 
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.26  
Another weakness of structural approaches like Lipset’s is that they do not specify the 
role of agency as well as why and how social actors initiate regime transformations. Jan Teorell 
suggests that the human agency is “black boxed” in structural approaches and institutional 
factors - such as urbanization, wealth, and industrialization - are given causal primacy such that 
democratic developments are located beyond the reach of human agency.27 Therefore, an effort 
to understand the genesis of democratization also needs to take into account the agency and 
strategic compromises between political elites. A sound bargaining between the political elites 
                                                          
22 Lipset (1959): 75. 
23 Hinnebusch (2006): 375. 
24 Socioeconomic and Caste Census (SECC) in India shows that 73 percent of Indians still live in villages and only 
less than 5 percent of them are able to pay their taxes. Among this rural population, less than 10 percent have paid 
jobs. See Ritika Katyal, “India census exposes extent of poverty,” CNN, August 2, 2015; see also Tarek Masoud, 
“Has the Door Closed on Arab Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 26 (1), 2015: 80. 
25 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2011 Report. 
26 Peter H. Smith, Democracy in Latin America: Political Change in Comparative Perspective (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2005): 50-53. 
27 Teorell (2010): 17-18. 
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could be a significant indicator to take into account while examining how democratization occurs 
about and how it is sustained. 
1.2. Reconsidering the Arab Uprisings     
 It is said that revolutions are impossible until they become inevitable.28 In MENA, the 
autocratic political framework has long blurred the distinction between the ruling party and 
ruling institutions, since the autocrats structure the state as their personal apparatus. Thus, in 
2010, people turned to streets since they did not see any political parties or political mechanisms 
that would represent them or to bring about a meaningful change in their lives.29 The 
hopelessness that none of the desired changes would be realized without revolutionary 
demonstrations left people no other options but to protest.30 
 Since the first days of the uprisings, scholars of Arab politics have been uncovering the 
reasons behind this “taboo-breaking” transformation in Arab political history. Those who had 
long based their arguments on cultural and essentialist claimed that “Muslim” democratization 
was not likely anytime soon were caught off guard. The main reasons behind these protests were 
mainly socio-economic, but the outcome became very political as the temper of crowds who took 
to the streets turned against long-standing and entrenched authoritarian governance. No other 
political process had similar transformative effects that the Arab Spring has had in the region for 
decades. Six countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria) were significantly 
affected by the uprisings through an overthrow of the incumbent ruler (Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, 
                                                          
28 Bruce Crumley, “Tunisia Pushes Out Its Strongman: Could Other Arab Countries Follow?” Time, January 14, 
2011, as cited in Mark L. Haas and David W. Lesch, The Arab Spring: Change and Resistance in the Middle East 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 2013): 3. 
29 James L. Gelvin, The Arab Uprisings: What Everyone Needs To Know (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012): 24. 
30 Haas and Lesch (2013): 3. 
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and Libya), repression of the social movements (Bahrain), or civil war (Syria). As Rick Stengel 
writes: 
No one could have known that when a Tunisian fruit vendor set himself on fire in a public square 
in a town barely on a map, he would spark protests that would bring down dictators in Tunisia, 
Egypt and Libya and rattle regimes in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain.31 
The Arab uprisings can be understood as the outcome of semi-autonomous social 
movements. The relatively autonomous civil society organizations played a major role in 
determining the course of the events. Daniel Brumberg coined the term liberalized autocracy. 
His categorization refers to long-standing authoritarian regimes that tolerate limited civil and 
economic liberties.32 George Joffe indicated that liberal autocracies, ironically, created “space for 
the evolution of autonomous precursor movements,”33 and this often led to their own destruction. 
Civil-society organizations in Tunisia and Egypt have been more established and capable of 
contesting regime authority (to differing degrees between the two) than similar organizations in 
other countries in the region. That is why the overthrow of the incumbent regimes became less 
painful than their equivalents in Libya and Yemen.34 
Smith noted that democratic openings usually begin in two ways in authoritarian regimes: 
transition via rupture, a sudden break from the authoritarian past, and transition via reforma, a 
type of change reached as a result of give-and-take bargains between the moderate figures of 
both those in power and those in opposition.35 In the case of Arab Spring, the revolutionary elites 
preferred the former scenario, desiring a “genuine” and rapid break from the old regime: a break 
                                                          
31 Rick Stengel, “Person of the Year Introduction,” Time, December 14, 2011. 
32 Daniel Brumberg, “Democratization in the Arab World? The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy,” Journal of 
Democracy 13 (4), 2002: 56; Emmanuel Sivan, “Illusions of Change,” Journal of Democracy 11 (3), 2000: 73; see 
also O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986): 7. 
33 George Joffe, “The Arab Spring in North Africa: Origins and Prospects,” The Journal of North African Studies 16 
(4), 2011: 517. 
34 Joffe (2011): 517. 
35 Smith (2005): 62-63. 
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not necessarily from the old regime figures but certainly from its undemocratic mentality. Thus, 
their ability of departing from the authoritarian legacy has played a significant role in their 
success to build a more democratic, if fragile, political system.  
1.3. The Problem of Authoritarian Resiliency and The Arab Uprisings 
At the onset, the Arab Spring was expected to bring about democratic transitions 
throughout the Arab world. However, Teorell (2010) is right when he writes, “democratization 
never just happens.”36 Although the protesters were making democratic demands, it would be too 
easy to consider this “democratic ambition” to be sufficient for a systematic transition towards a 
democratic regime. Indeed, political developments in recent decades have demonstrated that the 
democratic opening processes in the region are more prone to regressing into new authoritarian 
forms of governance, for example “competitive authoritarianism,”37 in which autocrats 
instrumentalize so-called competitive elections to camouflage authoritarian characteristics of 
their regimes. Besides, scholars have kept highlighting peculiar factors that make 
authoritarianism resilient in the MENA autocracies.38 Considering the process in its entirety, it is 
certain that factors that sparked region-wide demonstrations, mostly economic grievances, did 
not easily fade away but kept influencing the transition processes following the regime 
breakdowns.39 In addition, protesters toppled authoritarian rulers; however, the decades-long 
                                                          
36 Teorell (2010): 100. 
37 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
38 For a thorough analysis of why only few Arab states have experienced a regime change but the installation of a 
variation of a democracy in the Arab Spring context, see Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds, 
“Why the Modest Harvest?” Journal of Democracy 24 (4), 2013. 
39 Linz and Stepan (1996) argued that people who had lived under a non-democratic governance and made their lives 
in it for so long might experience difficulties to adapt themselves to an emergent democratic regime. Linz and 
Stepan discussed that this situation might eventually push individuals to assess the undemocratic past as not all bad 
as they thought when they compare the economic advantages the new democratic regime offers in the present to 
those that the past undemocratic regime provided. The majority of the public might consider the new democratic 
regime “politically legitimate” but simultaneously believe that the past undemocratic regime was economically more 
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legacy of the authoritarian political structures long sustained by these rulers continued to be 
resistant to change. The issue at stake was no longer autocracy as such, but how to make a 
transition to a functioning and relatively more democratic system.40 
It is clear that the achievement of democracy requires much more than simply the 
removal of the existing ruler. Brownlee et al. (2015) point out that the concept “regime change” 
usually creates hopes for a democratic transition following regime breakdown. However, for the 
most part, the “existing political structure” and “regime-society relations” tend to continue by 
and large following the regime breakdown.41 Holding a relatively minimalist stance, Samuel 
Huntington offered two-turnover test to check if a democratization process may be deemed 
successful: “a democracy may be viewed as consolidated if the party or group that takes power in 
the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to 
those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the 
winners of a later election.”42  
The democratization process following regime breakdown is complex as there is an 
extraordinary uncertainty about “what will replace the old order.” The outcome is twofold: either 
“the instauration of a political democracy or the restoration of a new, and possibly more severe, 
form of authoritarian rule.”43 Hopes of transition from authoritarian regime44 might gradually 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
effective. Linz and Stepan identified this pattern in Central European (post-Communist) and Southern European 
countries’ (especially Spain and Portugal) democratic transitions, particularly at their earlier stages. See their 
discussion on the issue, Linz and Stepan (1996): 143-147. 
40 Ibrahim Fraihat, Unfinished Revolutions: Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia after the Arab Spring (New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press, 2016): 1. 
41 Brownlee et al. (2015): 21-22. 
42 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: OK: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1991): 267, as quoted in Brownlee et al. (2015): 101. 
43 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986): 3. 
44 Some post-revolutionary actors believe that they would proceed directly from the removal of authoritarian leader 
to a substantive democratic order without experiencing any setbacks that might derail the transitional process. See 
Laurence Whitehead, Democratization: Theory and Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002): 45. 
18 
 
vanish as a country in transition reverts back to its ancien form of rule (status quo ante). For 
instance, once the regime collapses, socio-political polarization might replace the sense of 
national unity that emerged during the uprisings. Thus, managing deep grievances of people that 
just overthrew their authoritarian leader requires a masterful socio-political reconciliation. The 
tension between the beneficiaries of the old regime (e.g. strong institutions such as military 
establishment) and those who brought it down is one of the major obstacles to overcome during 
transitional periods.45  
With a close focus on the Arab Spring, out of the six countries that experienced the 
uprisings, Tunisia and Egypt differ from other cases significantly in moving towards a form of 
democratic order. How did this come about? To borrow from Brownlee et al. (2015), democratic 
transition is composed of the completion of transition (through founding elections) and the 
maintenance of transition (through drafting a liberal constitution and establishing a more 
participatory political system).46 Brownlee et al. cites Linz and Stepan’s (1996) 
conceptualization of when a democratic transition is considered completed, which is a different 
stage from the maintenance of the transition: 
 Sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected 
government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular 
vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the 
executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share 
power with other bodies de jure.47 
Mass protests in Syria and Bahrain failed in deposing the autocrat; therefore, these cases 
did not even meet the primary condition for democratization: the overthrow of the existing 
regime. What about Libya and Yemen? Demonstrations proved successful in unseating the 
                                                          
45 Fraihat (2016): 2-3. 
46 Brownlee et al. (2015): 171. 
47 Linz and Stepan (1996): 3, as quoted in Brownlee et al. (2015): 101. 
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authoritarian ruler, but what followed was a civil war in Libya and reinstitution of a political 
order (one that mirrored the old authoritarian past, but this process is not over yet) in Yemen. 
Therefore, those who demanded “change” in both cases did not go through even a contested 
election following the regime breakdown.  
As a result, the completion of transition phase took place only in Tunisia and Egypt. For 
the first time since their independence from colonial rule, people in Tunisia and Egypt were 
given an opportunity to freely choose who would rule the country. However, as noted earlier, 
while the ballot box is an indispensable requirement for a successful transition, it is not enough 
by itself to maintain the transition. Considering the divergence in the post-Arab Spring 
trajectories in Tunisia and Egypt, the following questions deserve a close consideration for the 
purpose of this research: What are the institutional and socio-political elements of a democratic 
transition besides holding elections? To what extent does the state formation or long-standing 
state institutions take a part in tipping a country towards democratic consolidation? Furthermore, 
as agency aspect of democratization processes, what role do political elites’ ideological 
standpoints and their flexibility/readiness to compromise those standpoints play in the 
maintenance of democratization process? Would a strong civil society move an authoritarian 
regime towards democratization? Considering the effective use of coercive apparatus in the 
hands of autocrats to suppress any liberalization demands in the public, the following would be a 
more plausible question: At what point does civil society activism under authoritarian conditions 
begin functioning as a catalyst to help sustain the democratization process? These questions will 
be addressed later in this study.  
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CHAPTER II 
2.1. Tunisia’s Revolution 
 Some Tunisians like to joke: “We are the only country that had a revolution on the Friday 
and went back to work on the Monday!”1 Exaggeration rooted in these remarks is actually 
appropriate to tell what has happened in Tunisia.  On January 14, 2011, Tunisians showed the 
world that they could no longer tolerate authoritarian governance. It was Tunisia where the 
dramatic chain of events broke out and led to the toppling of the twenty-three-year rule of 
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Tunisians proved that a change was possible, so those who 
were allured by this possibility immediately flowed onto the major squares of their countries. 
Considering the dramatic political change across the region, Tunisians themselves paid the 
lowest cost in terms of bloodshed when compared to other countries affected by the uprisings. 
Willis notes that the number of people who died in forcing Ben Ali to leave his office was less 
than 300 while thousands in neighboring Libya had to die in toppling Gaddafi.2 The revolution in 
Tunisia seemed surprising from the outside world since Tunisia had been regarded as one of the 
more prosperous and stable countries in the region.3 But apparently, in the eyes of the majority of 
Tunisians, the stability did in fact mean long-time anger, frustration, and hopelessness. Belief in 
revolution gathered people with different motivations (and from different backgrounds) together, 
leading them to one ultimate purpose: the overthrow of the one who had long made the life 
unbearable for the citizens. Once they overthrew the ruler, now it was the time to create the “new 
Tunisia.”  
                                                          
1 Michael J. Willis, “Revolt for Dignity: Tunisia’s Revolution and Civil Resistance,” in Adam Roberts, Michael J. 
Willis, Rory McCarthy, and Timothy Garden Ash (eds.), Civil Resistance in the Arab Spring: Triumphs and 
Disasters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016): 52. 
2 Willis (2016): 31. 
3 According to a World Bank report on Tunisia’s economic performance during 1990s and 2000s, Tunisia was the 
second fastest growing country in the MENA region, along with rapid poverty reduction since the 1970s, see “The 
Unfinished Revolution: Bringing Opportunity, Good Jobs, And Greater Wealth to All Tunisians,” The World Bank 
Development Policy Review, May 2014. 
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A close examination of the chain of revolutionary events that drove Tunisia to the regime 
breakdown in 2011 and the political transition in its aftermath will provide us with better insights 
into the broader issues of democratic transition and consolidation in the country. 
2.1.1. How did the Tunisian uprising begin?  
 The event that ultimately toppled Ben Ali’s twenty-three-year rule was the self-
immolation of a young street vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi, from Sidi Bouzid on December 17, 
2010. Bouazizi was 26 years old when he died. He was scrambling to earn enough by selling 
fruits and vegetables to support his mother, uncle, brothers and sisters. On December 17, 
although the details of the event still continue to be disputed, a policewoman, Faida Hamdy, 
confiscated some of Bouazizi’s fruits and vegetables and also his electronic scales because 
Bouazizi did not provide her a legal authorization or license to sell his wares. Then she slapped 
Bouazizi in the face for resisting the confiscation. He was also beaten by two other colleagues of 
Hamdy. All the charges against her and her colleagues were to be lifted later. Out of 
hopelessness, humiliation, and economic desperation, Bouazizi went to the municipal office to 
demand his wares, but according to the testimony of other vendors, he was beaten again. The fate 
of Tunisia was about to change on that day. He soaked himself in paint thinner in front of the 
municipal office and set himself on fire. He was hospitalized and died on January 4th since 
almost 90 percent of his body was covered with severe burns.4 
His “martyrdom” drew close attention through social media; pictures and videos showing 
his helplessness were broadcasted by Al-Jazeera throughout the country and the region. In a 
short while, many individuals and groups deprived of decent living conditions were to 
sympathize with Bouazizi’s personal sacrifice, as he became the embodiment of decades-long 
                                                          
4 Kareem Fahim, “Slap to a Man’s Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia,” New York Times, January 21, 2011, as cited in 
Willis (2016): 32. 
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anger, frustration, contempt, and desperation that people in the region had long felt. In other 
words, many people found something in common with Bouazizi’s plight and his setting himself 
on fire in front of the provincial municipality building in Sidi Bouzid. Likewise, on 22 
December, Lahseen Naji protested “joblessness and hunger” by electrocuting himself after 
climbing an electricity pylon.5 President Ben Ali was unable to understand how five decades of 
authoritarian rule invoked “the crisis of public identity” and made people do whatever it takes to 
depose him.6 In the aftermath of these suicides, the number of people attending the protests 
greatly increased; thus, the cost of repression of the demonstrations was very high for the 
government. For this reason, Ben Ali sat down with the opposition to engage in a dialogue and 
pledged fifty thousand new jobs, barely enough for a third of unemployed university graduates.7 
Two weeks after Bouazizi’s suicide attempt, Ben Ali visited Bouazizi at his bedside in the 
hospital. Nevertheless, “Pandora’s Box” had already opened in Tunisia and it was too late for 
Ben Ali to save his presidency.8  
 
Figure 2.1: Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali visits Mohammed Bouazizi in hospital on December 28, 2010, Source: AFP, also used in 
Willis (2016): 35. 
                                                          
5 Larbi Sadiki, “Tunisia: The battle of Sidi Bouzid,” Aljazeera, December 27, 2010. 
6 Noureddine Jebnoun, “In the shadow of power: civil-military relations and the Tunisian popular uprising,” The 
Journal of North African Studies 19 (3), 2014: 304.  
7 Gelvin (2012): 43. 
8 Yasmine Ryan, “The tragic life of a street vendor,” Al Jazeera, January 20, 2011. 
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The anger of people living in unbearable economic conditions began to come to light 
earlier than the crisis of Sidi Bouzid. The social unrest in Sidi Bouzid was actually the latest 
manifestation of the series of demonstrations dating back to January 2008. The local phosphate 
workers in Gafsa, the southwest of Sidi Bouzid, coordinated demonstrations protesting the local 
bureau of the national phosphate company for disproportionally allocating the jobs and 
increasing nepotism.9 Support for these demonstrations from unemployed graduates and local 
trade unions swiftly increased, so the authorities were able to stop the protests only after six 
months.10 The wave of demonstrations that culminated in 2010 in a remote and small town, Sidi 
Bouzid, demanding equality, justice, and decent living, conveyed the message that Tunisians 
could no longer live with Ben Ali and his brutal, clientelistic, and irresponsible regime.  
Ben Ali then acted resolutely and turned to the regime’s security apparatus, the military, 
to secure his grip on power. In terms of a carrot and stick tactic, the carrot (engaging in dialogue 
with the protesters and easing the regime’s brutality) did not help Ben Ali to prevent the protests 
from being increasingly robust. For this reason, he switched to brutal methods to thwart the 
protests. For example, in Kasserine, a town in western Tunisia, government snipers began to 
shoot protesters, killing twenty-one people, which further provoked protests.11  
On January 13, the wave of protests further inflamed by the social media and other media 
networks reached the capital, Tunis. Unhesitatingly, Ben Ali resorted to the force and ordered the 
army to disperse the crowds, but the chief of staff of the armed forces, Rachid Ammar, refused to 
take up arms against civilians. Instead, General Ammar placed the army between the protesters 
and the regime’s security units distinct from the military. Consequently, 14 January 2011 marked 
                                                          
9 Willis (2016): 33. 
10 Willis (2016): 33. 
11 Gelvin (2012): 47-48. 
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a historical moment in the Arab political history, one in which a peaceful uprising led to the 
overthrow of a ruler, when President Ben Ali stepped down and fled to Saudi Arabia.12 In her 
book, Ma Verité (My Truth), Leila Trabelsi, Ben Ali’s wife, wrote that Ben Ali had asked her to 
prepare for a “four or five days” visit to Saudi Arabia, assumed to be “long enough for the 
situation to return to normal.”13 However, it turned out to be a permanent visit. 
2.2. The Aftermath of Downfall of Ben Ali’s Regime: Interim Governments 
 First, the dissolution and reorganization of the state apparatus remnant of Ben Ali’s 
regime seemed to be the most urgent initiative. The state “establishment” that had long 
coordinated and legitimized Ben Ali’s authoritarian rule collapsed. However, it should be noted 
that the state itself was not on target, but the regime was. The state had long been the personal 
apparatus of President Ben Ali, evoking the famous remarks attributed to Louis XIV, “l'État c'est 
moi” (I am the state). Therefore, what the post-regime breakdown coalition aimed to do was first 
to draw a line between the ruling party, RCD (Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique, 
also called Constitutional Democratic Rally), and the state and second to put an end to the 
former.  
The former president and his wife took refuge in Saudi Arabia but a large number of their 
associates were tried, including some family members who coordinated the capitalist newtworks 
of Ben Ali and Trabelsi families.14 Former regime’s hardliners and the leadership cadres were 
arrested and the funds of the party liquidated.15 Furthermore, all the institutions that had close 
                                                          
12 Gelvin (2012): 43-44; see also Eva Bellin, “Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle  
East: Lessons from the Arab Spring,” Comparative Politics 44 (2), 2012: 134. 
13 “Ben Ali’s wife blames general for Tunisia ‘coup d’état’,” France 24, June 23, 2012, as cited in Nebahat Yasar, 
“Reconsidering Durability of Authoritarian Regime and Possibilities of Democratization in Tunisia,” Master’s 
Thesis, Middle East Technical University, July 2014: 76. 
14 Eberhard Kienle, “Egypt without Mubarak, Tunisia after Ben Ali: theory, history and the ‘Arab Spring’,” 
Economy and Society 41 (4), 2012: 539. 
15 Yasar (2014): 73. 
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relations to Ben Ali’s regime such as Chamber of Deputies, the upper house, the political police 
forces, and the Constitutional Court were repealed by an executive degree released on May 23, 
2011.16 
 Soft-liners and lesser figures of the former regime, who had not occupied any 
governmental positions for many years, played a significant role in the transition process up until 
the October 2011 elections to the Constituent Assembly. They criticized the former president and 
promised to move to a more democratic Tunisia. The new political situation needed urgency to 
form a system of governance and to handle the transition process. Therefore, under article 57 of 
the consitution, which focused on the possibility “of vacancy of the President of the Republic 
because of death, resignation, or absolute incapacity,” Fouad Mebazaa, the speaker and head of 
the former Parliament, became the interim president.17  
Another important figure in the transitional period was Mohamed Ghannouchi, the 
former Prime Minister of Ben Ali regime. The interim president asked Ghannouchi to form an 
interim government. On Monday, January 17, 2011, he announced his cabinet in which the 
former defence, foreign, interior, and finance ministers maintained their positions. Opposition 
figures were also included in this cabinet. Ahmed Ibrahim, the leader of the Ettajdid party, and 
Mustafa Ben Jafaar, the head of the Union of Freedom and Labor, were appointed to the ministry 
of higher education and the ministry of health, respectively.18 
  However, there was a significant amount of anger among Tunisians, who claimed the 
national unity government allocated very limited space and insignificant positions to the 
opposition groups. One hundred new political parties were formed in the aftermath of the fall of 
                                                          
16 Peter J. Schraeder and Hamadi Redissi, “Ben Ali's Fall,” Journal of Democracy 22 (3), 2011: 16; also cited in  
Yasar (2014): 73 
17 The Carter Center, “National Constituent Assembly Elections in Tunisia,” Final Report, October 23, 2011: 14. 
18 “Tunisia PM forms 'unity government’,” Al Jaazera, January 17, 2011. 
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the Ben Ali regime and a considerable number of the opposition groups were still not represented 
in the new interim government. One of the key opposition figures, Moncef Marzouki, even 
labelled the new interim government of Tunisia a “masquerade,” largely dominated by the old 
regime’s associates.19 He said on France’s I-Tele, “Tunisia deserved much more. Ninety dead, 
four weeks of real revolution, only for it to come to this? A unity government in name only 
because, in reality, it is made up of members of the party of dictatorship, the RCD.”20 Thousands 
of Tunisians were not satisfied with the reshuffling of the government. They were also frustrated 
by the slow pace of change.21 Because of this, they took the streets in Tunis to call for 
Ghannouchi’s resignation and a new national unity government. Reports say as many as 40,000 
protesters rallied in front of the prime minister’s office shouting both “Leave!” and “We do not 
want the friends of Ben Ali!”22 
 On February 26th, five people were reportedly killed and 16 security officers wounded 
during the protests accusing the new Prime Minister of having close links with the Ben Ali 
regime and of plotting to guarantee the failure of the January 14th revolution. A considerable 
portion of Tunisians felt that a sincere rupture with the old regime did not occur. Tunisia was on 
the verge of a new crisis. Recognizing the urgency of addressing the demands of the streets, the 
head of the Government Commission for Political Reform, Yadh Ben Achur, pointed out the risk 
that “the country will fall into anarchy in the transition towards a real multi-party democracy, if 
one does not act with great caution and responsibility.”23 Targeted by the social unrest, 
                                                          
19 “Tunisia PM forms 'unity government’,” Al Jaazera, January 17, 2011. 
20 “Tunisia PM forms 'unity government’,” Al Jaazera, January 17, 2011. 
21 Kim Willsher, “Tunisian prime minister Mohamed Ghannouchi resigns amid unrest,” The Guardian, February 27, 
2011. 
22 “Tunisia Forces Fire in Air, Fail to End Rally,” Reuters, February 20, 2011. 
23 Francesco Guidi, “Tunisian Prime Minister Mohammed Ghannouchi resigns,” About Oil, March 1, 2011.  
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Mohammed Ghannouchi resigned24 on February 27, 2011 after he said at a news conference, “I 
am not running away from responsibility. This is to open the way for a new prime minister. This 
resignation will serve Tunisia, and the revolution and the future of Tunisia.”25 
 Interim President Fouad Mebazaa appointed Beji Caid Essebsi, who was 88 years old at 
the time, as the new interim prime minister. Essebsi was a political figure from the Habib 
Bourguiba era. He formerly served as an ambassador, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 
Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defence, and the President of the Chamber of Deputies. 
His appointment was seen as a relative improvement since he had detached himself from the Ben 
Ali regime when he retired in 1994. The purging measures and resignations initiated in the first 
interim government continued in the second interim government headed by Essebsi. In February 
2011, 42 top officials from the Interior Ministry were forced to resign their positions. Moreover, 
the former Minister of the Interior Rafik Belhaj Kacem26, the former RCD Secretary General 
Mohamed Ghariani, and the former Minister of Defence Ridha Grira were arrested.27 
 On March 3rd, President Mebazaa announced a new transitional plan in which Tunisians 
would vote for a “National Constituent Assembly” on July 24th, responsible for crafting a new 
constitution before the presidential and parliamentary elections.28 On April 12th, the High 
Commission on Political Reform issued a new electoral law, which served to lay down the basis 
for the July 2011 election. The new law set out a one-round voting system adopting proportional 
                                                          
24 He was followed by two other ministers close to Ben Ali, namely the Interior Minister and the International 
Cooperation Minister, Mohamed Afif Chelbi and Mohamed Nouri Jouini, respectively. Najib Chebbi, the founder of 
the Progressive Democratic Party, and Ahmed Ibrahim, the leader of the Ettajdid, also resigned in order to separate 
themselves from the interim government. 
25 Willsher, “Tunisian prime minister Mohamed Ghannouchi resigns amid unrest,” The Guardian, February 27, 
2011. 
26 He was later sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment. 
27 Yasar (2014): 86. 
28 Alexis Arieff, “Political Transition in Tunisia,” CRS Report for Congress, April 15, 2011: 1. 
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representation and a 50 percent required threshold for women candidates.29 The law also banned 
the former RCD officials from running in the upcoming election, which aimed to respond to the 
streets’ demands for a more sincere and more inclusive political transformation with new 
political figures.30  
2.3. The Changing Face of Tunisian Politics: The 2011 Elections 
 After the departure of Ben Ali, Tunisians demanded a more genuine departure from the 
old regime. The public did not tolerate the presence of technocrats and political figures linked to 
the Ben Ali regime in the interim governments. For this reason, there was a very high 
expectation for the upcoming election, which was originally planned for July 24th. However, 
there was a relatively more established and better-prepared political actor in Tunisia’s new 
political scene: Ennahdha, Tunisia’s top Islamist movement. Many secularists were uneasy about 
the likelihood of an overwhelming victory for Islamists in the ballot box, for this reason, they 
sought to postpone the July elections until a “more credible” voter composition would emerge in 
favor of them.31 Some of the political parties, including the Islamist Ennahdha and the 
Progressive Democratic Party, initially opposed the postponement, but they later consented to it. 
Therefore, the Assembly election was delayed until October 23, 2011.  
How did Tunisia’s democratic performance before the October elections look? It was 
ranked by different credible sources as follows: 
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Measurement 
Name and year of 
report or database 
Institution Index Points, ranking and classification 
Political Rights and 
freedom 
Freedom House 
Report, 2010 
Freedom House 
Political Rights 
(PR) and Civil 
Liberties (CL) 
PR: 7, CL: 5 (Scale of 1free to 7, not 
free) 
Classification: Not free 
Degree of democracy in 
earlier elections 
Polyarchy 2.0, 2003 
(referring to the 2002 
elections 
Peace Research Institute 
of Oslo and Tatu 
Vanhanen 
ID: Synthetic 
Democracy index, 
Part: Participation, 
Comp: Competition 
ID: 1.5, Max: 49 
Part: 33.7, Max: 70 
Comp: 4.5, Max: 70 
(Democracy minimum: ID: 5, Part: 10, 
Comp: 30) 
Classification: Non-democratic 
Consolidation of 
authoritarian and 
democratic institutions 
Polity IV, 2010 
Center for International 
Development and 
Conflict Management, 
University of Maryland 
Democracy: 
consolidation of 
democratic 
institutions 
Autocracy: 
authoritarian 
consolidation 
Polity: synthesis of 
both 
Democracy: 1 
Autocracy: 5 
Polity: -4 
(Scale of +10, very democratic to -10, 
very authoritarian) 
Classification: Autocratic 
 
Perception of Corruption 
Transparency 
International 
Corruption Perception 
Index, 2010 
Transparency 
International 
TICPI: Perception 
of corruption index 
TICPI: 4.3 points out of 10, (Scale of 1 
very corrupt to 10 not at all corrupt) 
Ranking: 59 out of 178 Countries 
Classification: Not transparent 
Management of political 
and economic change 
Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index 
(BTI), 2010 
Bertelsmann Foundation 
MI: Management 
Index, quality of 
transformation 
management 
MI: 4.3 out of 10, Ranking: 87 out of 
128 countries 
Classification: Moderate management 
Democracy, including 
press status and corruption 
World Democracy 
Audit, May 2011 
World Audit 
World Democracy 
Ranking: Political 
Freedom (FH) + 
Press and 
Corruption (TI) 
World Democracy Ranking: 113 out of 
150 countries, division 4 out of 4 
Table 2.1: Classification of Tunisia’s Democratic Performance, Retrieved from Rafael Bustos, “Election Report: Tunisia/Constituent 
Assembly Elections: October 23, 2011,” Opemam Analysis, November 27, 2011: 3, available at 
http://www.opemam.org/sites/default/files/ER-Tunisia_Constituent_assembly_2011.pdf (accessed November 23, 2016). 
There were three categories of individuals who were excluded from candidacy during the 
electoral process; two of these categories covered the ones who had held governmental positions 
under the Ben Ali regime and the other category banned the ones who had signed a petition in 
2010 asking Ben Ali to run for president in 2014.32  
 The first electoral experience in Tunisia is considered transparent and consistent with the 
universal standards of direct and equal opportunity for candidates and equal suffrage for voters, 
which was exceptional given their history of rigged elections. The participation of women and 
                                                          
32 The Carter Center, “National Constituent Assembly Elections in Tunisia,” October 23, 2011: 18. 
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youth in the electoral and political process represented an important step towards a more 
inclusive political atmosphere in Tunisia.33 In contrast to all the reportedly rigged elections 
during Ben Ali’s rule, Tunisians, for the first time, enjoyed the unique opportunity to vote for 
whoever would rule the country’s transition process for the following year.  
As mentioned above, a new proportional electoral system was adopted, thus under this 
new regulation, the system did not require parties to secure any voting threshold to make it into 
the new assembly. Through this new system, the strengthening of the percentage of the seats 
over the percentage of the general votes became the norm, which benefitted the smaller parties 
more.34 In the election, 27 different political groups were voted for with a remarkable turnout of 
approximately 86.1% of the population: 17 political parties, 1 coalition, and 9 independent 
lists.35 
Final Election Results 
Political Party Number of Seats Percentage 
Ennahdha 89 41 percent 
Congress for the Republic (CPR) 29 13.4 percent 
Popular Petition (Al Aridha Al Chaabia) 26 12 percent 
Ettakatol 20 9.2 percent 
Democratic Progressive Party (PDP) 16 7.4 percent 
The Initiative (Al Moubadara) 5 2.3 percent 
Democratic Modernist Pole (PDM) 5 2.3 percent 
Afek Tounes 4 1.8 percent 
Al Badil Althawri 3 1.4 percent 
Democratic Socialist Movement (MDS) 2 0.9 percent 
Movement of the People (Haraket Achaab) 2 0.9 percent 
Independent Lists 1 for each 0.5 percent 
Total 217  
Table 2.2: Electoral Results, Source: The Carter Center, “National Constituent Assembly Elections in Tunisia,” 54, available at 
https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/tunisia-final-oct2011.pdf (accessed November 23, 2016). 
Tunisia’s first democratic electoral experience led to a surprising outcome. According to 
the results declared by the ISIE (Instance Supérieure Indépendante pour les Elections), the 
independent body responsible for organizing the October elections, the Islamist Ennahdha, long 
                                                          
33 The Carter Center, “National Constituent Assembly Elections in Tunisia,” 20. 
34 Rafael Bustos, “Election Report: Tunisia/Constituent Assembly Elections: October 23, 2011,” Opemam Analysis, 
November 27, 2011: 4. 
35 Bustos, “Election Report: Tunisia/Constituent Assembly Elections: October 23, 2011,” 4. 
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seen as a “usual suspect” by both Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes, won the elections by securing 
89 seats in the parliament. The CPR won 29 seats, Popular Petition won 26 seats, and Ettakatol 
won 20 seats. The Ennahdha’s electoral victory was momentous as the result of the first 
democratic initiative in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. A sizeable number of Tunisians tasked 
Islamists with building Tunisia’s political future. In the aftermath of the elections, Tunisia 
entered into a new political phase in which leading political figures, most of whom were new to 
politics, faced the hardship of mitigating the fierce debate between secular and religious 
discourses and of drafting the new constitution in the shadow of this confrontation.   
2.4. Ennahdha’s Rise to Power 
 The post-Ben Ali socio-political landscape witnessed the emergence of various political 
groups as noted above; approximately 100 political parties were legalized up until the first free 
and democratic elections held in October, 2011. In the aftermath of the elections, secularists 
feared that the victory of Islamists would alienate them and narrow the socio-political space for 
those who did not identify themselves with the Islamist ideology. The secularists were afraid that 
the Islamists would ruin the hopeful atmosphere unfolded by the uprisings by seeking revengeful 
policies. However, Ennahdha, whose religious reference and political history was long used as an 
excuse by old regimes to control and repress its political influence, was well aware of secular 
concerns and expectations. The leading elites in the Ennahdha party, therefore, believed that a 
more consensual cabinet should be formed, covering a wide political spectrum; thus, a sizeable 
number of political actors would feel represented and included in the process of erecting the new 
republic. Consequently, Ennahdha, the CPR, and the leftist Ettakatol formed a troika government 
in which Ennahdha would take the premiership, the CPR would fill the presidency, and Ettakatol 
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would determine the chairmanship of the constituent assembly.36 Therefore, Hamadi Jebali, from 
the Ennahdha party, became the first elected prime minister, and Moncef Marzouki, from the 
CPR, filled the presidency. In the first meeting of the constituent assembly, the leader of 
Ettakatol, Mustapha Ben Jafaar, was elected the assembly speaker with 145 votes.37  
 The legislative and executive divisions of Tunisia’s new government were formed in a 
power-sharing manner, in which different ministries were shared among coalition partners. Yet, 
the most important issue facing Tunisia’s new government was to draft the new constitution. The 
government started the writing process in February 2012 by generating six commissions, each 
composed of 22 members, individually responsible for dealing with a particular element of the 
new constitution.38  
 One substantive disagreement between Islamists and seculars was whether Tunisia would 
have a parliamentary or presidential system. Ennahdha supported the former, in which the 
government would be led by a prime minister and the leading party, or a coalition if necessary.39 
The general viewpoint among Ennahdha’s leading figures was that a parliamentary system would 
prevent the centralization of political authority, with which Tunisia is very familiar from its 
history. Rachid Ghannouchi, who had lived in political exile in London for twenty-two years, 
declared on November 2011 that there is a need to “change the political system from a 
presidential one in which power is concentrated in one person, the president, to a parliamentary 
                                                          
36 Sana Ajmi, “Ongoing Negotiations Between Ennahda, CPR and Ettakatol,” Tunisialive, November 13, 2011, also 
cited in Brownlee et al. (2015): 139. 
37 “Tunisia Coalition agrees top government posts,” BBC, November 21, 2011; see also “Tunisia: Elected 
Constituent Assembly Holds Inaugural Session,” Global Voices, November 24, 2011, also cited in Brownlee et al. 
(2015): 139. 
38 Muhammad Ali Khalifa, “Al-Shuruq tanshur qa’imat a’da’ al-lijan al-ta’sisiya: Ha’ula’ sayaktibun dustur Tunis 
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one in which power resides with the people. We want to bring power from on high down to the 
people, represented in parliament.”40 Apparently, Ennahdha’s leading elites were afraid of a 
presidential takeover, thus seeing parliamentary system as a safeguard against this “undesired 
possibility.” However, many secularists favored the latter, out of a fear that a pure parliamentary 
system would bring about a dictatorship if a democratically elected party desires to dominate the 
executive and legislative branches. Intrinsically, they were afraid of a possible Islamist 
monopoly over Tunisia’s politics in consideration of Islamists’ ability to mobilize their 
grassroots during electoral processes. According to their reasoning, in a presidential system, the 
president would help parties with high nationally favorable individuals, who could settle political 
disputes promptly by avoiding the bureaucratic “shackles” of a parliamentary system.41 
Eventually, Islamists and non-Islamists agreed upon “a democratic republican system,” which 
positioned the president at the top of government but also gave some autonomy to the 
parliament.42 
 Prior to the parliamentary election, political parties could not agree on how long the new 
government, primarily responsible for drafting the new constitution, should remain in office. On 
the one hand, Ennahdha leaders opposed specifying a termination date on the new government 
since putting a timeline would impede the new government’s powers and prevent it from 
addressing other socio-economic demands. Ziad Ladhari, a member of Ennahdha and 
Constituent Assembly, said, “We in Ennahda have been talking about an 18-month period for the 
Constituent Assembly and we want to assure our people and the international community that we 
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will abide by our promise.”43 On the other hand, left-wing parties and liberals believed that the 
new government would remain in office “without end” unless an expiration date was 
determined.44 In the end, Ennahdha elites and their secular counterparts compromised on a 
mandate of twelve months, which bound that the next parliamentary elections would be held on 
no later than March 20, 2013; however, this turned out to be difficult given that socio-political 
puzzles proved challenging during the constitution drafting process in the upcoming months, 
which extended the original schedule.45 
2.5. The Incorporation of Shari’a into the Constitution 
Beginning from the first day of announcement of the electoral results, Ennahdha’s 
leading elites aimed at alleviating “secular” or “non-Islamist” concerns. The issue of women 
rights was one of the vitrines for the party to win over the suspicions of secular segments of the 
society. Soon after the election, Rachid Ghannouchi declared that the Ennahdha party did not 
have any intention of amending the progressive Personal Status Code of 1957, which had 
guaranteed Tunisian women full equality as citizens and the right to education.46  
Perhaps the most worrisome issue for non-Islamists was whether the Ennahdha party 
would push for a provision in the constitution proposing the sharia would be a or the source of 
legislation. Rachid Ghannouchi spent a lot of energy to assure his counterparts before the 
election that the sharia would not be included in the constitution. However, this move turned into 
backlash by creating dissent in his party’s grassroots. For, ordinary members of the party 
expected their leaders to place the sharia in the constitution. At the time, opinion polls indicated 
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that a sizeable number (66 percent among men, 56 percent among women) of Tunisian people 
desired the constitution to be “partially” or “wholly” based on “Shari’a,” similar to Arab 
countries that experienced the same political upheaval.47 In the midst of fierce discussions about 
the role of Shari’a in the new political landscape, Sahbi Atiq, a member of Ennahdha in the 
Constituent Assembly at the time, said Islam needed be incorporated “in the structures of the 
state, and not be a mere slogan.” He then declared, “Islam relates to the life of the individual, to 
the affairs of the family, to society’s rule, to the foundations of the state, and to the relations with 
the world.”48 However, at the end of March 2012, Ghannouchi stated that Ennahdha would be 
satisfied with keeping the preexisting first clause of the existing constitution, which recognizes 
that Islam is the religion of the state, not mentioning shari’a.49  
Essentially, there were two significant reasons behind what pushed Ennahdha leaders to 
give up inscribing shari’a in the constitution. The first reason was directly associated with 
electoral outcomes. Ennahdha won the elections; however, the party could not secure the 
majority of the votes, which drove it to form a coalition with two center-left parties. Unlike 
Ennahdha, these parties explicitly opposed mentioning shari’a in the new constitution. For them, 
shari’a could be interpreted in different ways, one that would shatter the national unity and 
existing state structures.50 Secondly, Ennahdha leaders worried that insisting on inscribing 
shari’a in the constitution would be used as leverage by their rivals – not only political parties 
but also civil society organizations – against them. There were women’s rights groups, unions, 
                                                          
47 Sigma Conseil, “Les Tunisiens, la politique et la religion,” Poll of May 3-4, 2012; see also Dalia Mogahed, “Arab 
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and several leftist organizations on the streets sporadically demonstrating against the troika 
government. Therefore, Ennahdha leaders took a pragramatic stance that aimed to minimize 
socio-political tensions and refrain from any politically “sensitive” moves that would derail the 
political transition process.51 Malika Zeghal writes: 
This was the result of a political compromise-not only between Islamists and their political 
opponents but also within al-Nahda itself. Indeed, the view that Islam was an integral set of values 
to be implemented in all domains of life was not shared by all members of al-Nahda’s leadership. 
Even more important, it became clear within al-Nahda that implementing a Muslim state did not 
require constitutionalizing shari’a law.52 
2.6. Transitional Politics in Tunisia: 2011-2013 
 Under the troika governance, new political actors appeared, forcing the new government 
to complete the constitution-writing process and address socio-economic setbacks that 
challenged the country’s transition before the forthcoming election. The most prominent of these 
new actors was the secular Nidaa Tounes (Call of Tunisia), which was founded in July 2012 
under the leadership of Beji Caid Essebsi, the prime minister of the first interim government in 
2011. October 2011 electoral results proved that the political power of Ennahdha party, whose 
grounded grassroots mobilization had long been superior to other political organizations, would 
only be challenged by new political alliances among non-Islamist parties. Therefore, parties in 
opposition that were not represented in the troika government joined in an umbrella party, Nidaa 
Tounes. The new party soon magnetized appeal from a wide socio-political spectrum, including 
young people, trade-union activists, secularists, and former members of the RCD, the ruling 
party of Ben Ali era.53  
 Nidaa Tounes aimed at confronting the Ennahdha party by positioning itself in 
“modernist” camp, assuming that it would resonate well across large segments of non-Islamists 
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who believed a modernist alternative was needed to push back “those who wished to undo the 
gains of ‘modern Tunisia’.”54 Yet, a large number of Tunisians, especially those living in rural 
regions of Tunisia, were uncomfortable about Nidaa Tounes moves placing former RCD 
members in local party offices. Many Tunisians began to speak out the fear of “tejemaa,” a 
counterrevolution staged by the old regime establishment.55 In the midst of such allegations 
against the party, Faouzi Elloumi, a member of the party’s executive committee, stated, “The 
tejemaa and the Destourians are the same thing—there’s no difference.”56 Soon after, leading 
figures of the party openly censured Elloumi’s statements, complaining that such remarks would 
not help but only instigate further criticism against the party. Yet, top figures in the party also 
acknowledged the overlap between Nidaa Tounes and the RCD. Mohsen Marzouk, one of the 
party’s most recognizable figures, said, “Look—you cannot create a party from 
scratch…Ennahda was here for forty years [sic]. We have been here for seven months…There 
were two million people in the RCD. It has been dismantled, so these people are now in the 
nature.  It is only natural that a lot of people who were in the RCD will join our party.”57  
 It was not certain whether Nidaa Tounes would be able to tackle the suspicions over the 
party’s real intention and thus consolidate its appeal over the country’s center-left prior to the 
next parliamentary elections.58 However, there were serious and alarming developments that 
could have derailed the country’s transition. On February 6, 2013, Chokri Belaid, a leading 
member of the Popular Front party and prominent leftist opponent of the Islamist-led 
government, was assassinated in front of his home in Tunis. His assassination further escalated 
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ongoing political tensions, leading scores of people to pour into the streets. Protesters came to 
believe that radical Islamist elements were responsible for the killing. They demanded that 
Jebali’s cabinet resign because they believed the government had not seemed eager to take a firm 
stance against Salafi groups since the elections.59 Jebali condemned the killing but did not clearly 
specify which group was behind the assassination. He said, “The murder of Belaid is a political 
assassination and the assassination of the Tunisian revolution. By killing him they wanted to 
silence his voice.”60  
 In order to soothe increasing public anger at his party, Jebali consented to form a new 
caretaker government that would consist of non-partisan technocrats and lead the country to 
general elections. However, Ennahdha’s leading elites did not support Jebali’s proposal. 
Abdelhamid Jelassi, the vice-president of Ennahdha, said, “The prime minister did not ask the 
opinion of his party. We in Ennahda believe Tunisia needs a political government now. We will 
continue discussions with other parties about forming a coalition government.”61 As he could not 
gain his party’s approval for his plan, Prime Minister Jebali resigned and Ennahdha tasked Ali 
Larayedh, the then-Interior Minister, with forming a new government in two weeks.62  
 In the meantime, a draft of the constitution was released in April 2013. The discussion 
process of each article of the country’s new constitution continued in the midst of many 
criticisms. The Human Rights Watch criticized the draft for not affirming universal human rights 
such as freedom of thought and freedom of conscience in its entirety.63 The Civil Coalition to 
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Defend Freedom of Expression64 expressed its concern over articles limiting freedom of 
expression and free media by sending an open letter to the National Constituent Assembly 
saying, “both the preamble and the text of the draft Constitution do not explicitly stipulate a 
commitment to protect freedom of expression.”65 However, the country witnessed another 
painful development in July 2013, when Mohamed Brahmi was assassinated, which was only six 
months after Chokri Belaid’s. Shortly after, the UGTT called for a general strike across the 
country.66 Tunisia’s transition was threatened once again by a jihadi-motivated violence. 
Hundreds and thousands of protesters gathered in the capital’s Bardo Square to call for the 
government’s resignation (Bardo Crisis).67 Ennahdha was harshly blamed for not confronting the 
emergence and activities of Salafi groups. Civil society groups and new political blocs began to 
call for decisive measures to be taken against Islamist extremism. President Marzouki called for 
a “National Dialogue” to settle the crisis.68 Having seen a significant decline in its popularity, the 
Ennahdha party consented to an agreement similar to the former Prime Minister Hamid Jebali’s 
plan: resigning and relinquishing the governmental control in favor of a fully technocratic 
caretaker cabinet that would rule the country until new elections and complete the constitution-
drafting process.  
 On January 9, 2014, Ali Larayedh announced the resignation of his government, making 
him the first Islamist prime minister in the Arab world to resign willingly, which ended his 
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party’s two-year rule.69 Ennahdha’s decision showed that the party listened to the concerns and 
demands that dominated Tunisia’s streets instead of ignoring them by adopting firm security 
measures against the protests on the pretext of counterinsurgency, which would have entirely 
derailed the transitional process. The party’s leading figures did not let Tunisia’s experience turn 
into a civil war between religious and secular fronts. Ghannouchi later explained, “Larayedh’s 
resignation was a lesson of peaceful alternation of power and of Islamist respect of democratic 
rules.”70 Through the mediation of the UGTT (which would be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize 
for these dialogue-making efforts in October 2015), Ennahdha and its secular rivals came 
together to the national dialogue table for setting a path for the remaining of transitional process.  
Having realized the fragility of the country’s transition process, political parties settled on the 
then-minister of industry, Mehdi Jomaa, to be the interim prime minister.71 On January 26, 2014, 
several months after the final draft of the country’s new constitution was submitted to the 
National Constituent Assembly, the final constitution was adopted in the Assembly by a vote of 
200 for, 12 against, and 4 abstentions, over 92 percent.72  
2.7. The Lustration Law: The Most Decisive Compromise of Ennahdha 
Political developments throughout 2013 tested the fragility of the transition process in 
Tunisia. Most of the time, transitional processes require serious concessions and bargains from 
political parties that usually represent opposing ideologies. Through these concessions and 
bargains, political elites could find a common ground to resolve problems threatening the 
transition and to win over suspicions of the “other.”  
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In Tunisia, Ennahdha’s step down from power when it became urgent for the sake of 
preserving the transition can be interpreted in the way that the party put national interests above 
partisan interests. Although it gave rise to some internal disputes within the party, compromising 
a number of ideological issues during the constitution-drafting process played a key role in 
keeping the transition on track. For example, the party (1) transformed its perspective on gender 
issues, taking a more liberal stance; (2) withdrew an article that would have put in action 
blasphemy; (3) gave up on incorporating sharia into the new constitution as a source of 
legislation.73 However, none of these concessions led to as much debate within the party as the 
one over withdrawing a lustration law that would have banned political figures known for their 
past association with the Ben Ali regime from contesting in upcoming elections.74 At the 
grassroots level, Ennahdha members considered an exclusion law a natural step that should be 
taken in order to preserve Tunisia’s transition; otherwise, old regime actors would reverse the 
gains of revolution should they come to power through an electoral process.75  
However, Tunisia had been going through an extraordinary process throughout 2013, not 
only domestically but also regionally; therefore, the manifestation of partisan ideologies seemed 
less important than the maintenance of transition. The slow pace of the process of constitution-
drafting coupled with two political assassinations increased the tension across the country; but, 
more frightening developments were occurring in Egypt at the time. The overthrow of Muslim 
Bortherhood-led government through a military coup on July 3, 2013 reminded Ennahdha once 
again of how constrained and fragile its position as an Islamist party was.76 Having realized 
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coup-friendly circumstances that would have been created by a lustration law as experienced in 
Algeria in the early 1990s, Ghannouchi sought to convince the leading figures within his party to 
sacrifice lustration in order to “coup-proof” Tunisia’s politics. On voting day, while Ennahdha’s 
39 members in the National Constituent Assembly voted for lustration, five members voted 
against the article 167, which would have excluded old regime-oriented figures from running for 
the elections (including presidential candidate Beji Caid Essebsi). In the end, through 
Ghannouchi’s lobbying (he even appeared on a secular channel Nessma TV to assure that the 
law would not be passed), the article did not pass by a single vote.77 For the prospect of Tunisia’s 
transition, the key political leaders preferred inclusion and power-sharing to alienation and 
exclusion, thus marking one of the momentous moments in the transitional process.  
2.8. Alternation of Power: The Legislative and Presidential Elections of 2014 
 The parliamentary election was held on October 26, 2014 without any significant 
incident, which mirrored the atmosphere of 2011 elections. The electoral process was considered 
by international observers free and fair, which reaffirmed the political actors’ commitment to 
democratization process. Nidaa Touness, which possessed organic ties to the overthrown old 
regime, secured the most seats in the parliament by defeating its Islamist rival, Ennahdha, which 
had claimed the majority of the seats three years ago.78 Despite all of its compromises and 
bargains that proved vital to secure the transitional politics in Tunisia, Ennahdha failed to deliver 
effectively on socio-economic demands of the public in the midst of considerably challenging 
political developments such as two assassinations and later the Bardo crisis; thus expectedly, 
Tunisians turned to support other political alternatives.  
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 Final Election Results 
Political Party Number of Seats Percentage 
Nidaa Tounes 86 37.5 percent 
Ennahdha 69 27.7 percent 
Free Patriotic Union 16 4.1 percent 
Popular Front 15 3.6 percent 
Afek Tounes 8 3 percent 
Congress for the Republic (CPR) 4 2 percent 
Table 2.3: Electoral Results, Source: Election Guide, available at http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2746/ (accessed December 14, 2016). 
Danya Greenfield says, “[I]t has long been a truism of democratic transitions that it is the 
second elections, not the first, that determines whether a new democratic regime has been 
consolidated.”79 Political actors accepted the outcome of the second election as the alternation of 
power took place without any refusal on Ennahdha’s side. Ghannouchi called his rival Essebsi on 
the evening of the election and congratulated him. Then, he organized a party right outside 
Ennahdha’s campaign headquarters to celebrate holding the second election in the country since 
the revolution.80 Although Nidaa Tounes might have tried to form a government with the smaller 
parties and exclude Ennahdha from the cabinet, both parties instead settled on delaying the 
formation of the new government until presidential elections scheduled on November 23, 2014; 
this was so the new president would appoint a new prime minister.81 
Ennahdha did not nominate any candidate in the presidential elections since it refrained 
from being perceived as a dominating political actor in both the parliament and now the 
presidency; therefore, the party preferred the former to the latter. The first round of the 
presidential elections was completed as Nidaa Tounes’s candidate Beji Caid Essebsi garnered 
39.5 percent of the popular vote. The current president, CPR’s Moncef Marzouki, whom 
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Ennahdha was believed to lean towards, came second with 33.4 percent.82 The second round of 
the ballot held in December reaffirmed the victory of Essebsi as he won run-off vote with 55.6 
percent of the general vote, followed by Marzouki’s 44.3 percent.83 Shortly after, Essebsi 
appeared on a local television and stated, “I dedicate my victory to the martyrs of Tunisia. I 
thank Marzouki, and now we should work together without excluding anyone,”84 which signaled 
his intention to maintain the emergent conciliatory political culture first initiated by Ennahdha in 
2011.  
2.9. Politics of Concession 
 Habib Essid, a former Minister of the Interior in the Essebsi’s interim government in 
2011, was nominated by Nidaa Tounes as the new Prime Minister to form the new cabinet. On 
February 4, 2015, he proposed a new unity government that would include the biggest rival of 
Nidaa Tounes, Ennahdha.85 In a follow-up interview, Mondher Belhadj Ali, the leader of Nidaa 
Tounes, reaffirmed the significance of working with Ennahdha to tackle the challenges facing the 
country. He said, “We can even have excellent relations with them – they’re not going to wind 
up in prison under our rule.” He then added, “the country’s true enemies are poverty, illiteracy, 
and economic underdevelopment.”86 Ali’s remarks shows how tolerance for a political opponent 
has become a characteristic of Tunisian transition.  
 Instead of centralizing political authority by forming a coalition with smaller parties, 
which would have left Ennahdha (the second largest party in 2014 parliamentary election) in 
opposition, Nidaa Tounes opted to share power with Ennahdha. First, Habib Essid himself was a 
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technocrat rather than an obedient partisan figure. Second, Nidaa Tounes chose nonpartisan 
figures for the ministries of Justice and Defense. Four ministerial posts were assumed by 
Ennahdha, including Minister of Employment, along with three deputy ministries (finance, 
health care establishments, and international developments.)87 Ennahdha might have accepted 
this relative under-representation in order to avoid an Egypt-like fate; however, the new political 
atmosphere in Tunisia, despite Nidaa Tounes having secured both premiership and presidency, 
seems to have mirrored the one when Ennahdha dominated the electoral process four years ago 
but did not covet all executive powers. 
2.10. Challenges and Prospects 
In 2015, Tunisia witnessed three major terrorist attacks, firstly in the Bardo Museum 
(which left 22 tourists dead) in March, secondly in Sousse (at least 39 tourists were killed) in 
June, and lastly in central Tunis (which killed 12 presidential guards); ISIS claimed 
responsibility for all of these attacks. Expectedly, these attacks caused serious short-term 
damages to the tourism industry, up to 15 percent of Tunisia’s economy.88  
 The economic situation did not improve as expected throughout 2015 as unemployment 
stood at around 15 percent by the end of the year. Before entering 2016, negative effects of the 
terrorist attacks of 2015 continued to be felt on economy as they discouraged foreign 
investments, thereby having the dinar decreased in value relatively more in comparison to other 
currencies.89  
 Despite all these challenges and hurdles, Tunisia’s democratization experience has 
demonstrated a high level of political maturity and tolerance, which is shared by all key political 
                                                          
87 Laurence, “Tunisia, The Courage of Compromise.” 
88 Rory McCarthy, “Will Tunisia’s fragile transition survive the Sousse attack?” in Tunisia’s Volatile Transition to 
Democracy, POMEPS Briefings 27, November 6, 2015: 30. 
89 “2015: A Year In Review,” Tunisialive, December 28, 2015. 
46 
 
actors, regardless of ideological agenda. Tunisia has proven to the world that tackling 
multidimensional political problems that a country faces during its transition from authoritarian 
rule cannot be realized through the concentration of power in the hands of the majority but the 
distribution of it among political rivals. Holding two legislative elections in which political 
power successfully alternated between different actors without any incidents reaffirmed the 
success of Tunisia’s transition. Political challenges introduced by periodic setbacks have been 
overcome through a consensual understanding. In 2014, the country adopted one of the most 
libertarian constitutions that a Muslim country has ever accepted before. With these significant 
achievements, the transitional process has completed in Tunisia today, which is leaving current 
and prospective governments the main responsibilities of maintaining order and stability and of 
restoring the economy in the country. 
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CHAPTER III 
3.1. Egypt’s Tahrir Revolution 
The Arab Spring was born out of an individual decision that created a shared language 
across the region. Egypt became the second country into which the Arab Spring spilled. 
Egyptians who saw Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali dethroned by their Tunisian fellow Arabs followed 
suit. On January 25, 2011, protests (as in sit-ins, general strikes, and various other non-violent 
demonstrations) that were to run for 18 days began.  
Although it started in Tunisia, Egypt is generally accepted as the focal point of the Arab 
Spring process. After compelling President Mubarak to resign, Egypt entered into a new period 
in which Egyptians were given the opportunity to democratically choose their president for the 
first time. This surely increased the expectations towards the possibility of a democratic 
transition in Egypt. 
The post-Mubarak political atmosphere witnessed fundamental political and 
constitutional changes. However, these changes were made very quickly and at the expense of a 
broad-based consensus. The major political actors dominant in constructing the post-Mubarak 
Egypt were the military and the Muslim Brotherhood. The rise of Islamist Muslim Brotherhood 
on the new Egypt’s political landscape came as a suprise to many observers, but considering its 
well-established and deep socio-economic networks within the society, it was not unexpected at 
all. 
 With all legislative and executive transformation orchestrated chiefly by the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the military up until July 3, 2013, Egypt had gone through a socio-
economically and politically turbulent transition process. After only one year of Islamist 
Mohamed Morsi’s governance, Egyptians poured into Tahrir Square again and demanded the 
resignation of Morsi’s government. Within this politically complicated atmosphere, the military 
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stepped in and ousted Morsi on July 3, 2013.1 The Muslim Brotherhood’s de jure and legitimate 
governance deriving from the popular vote was entirely pushed aside by the military. The 
military’s takeover and its aftermath ceased the transition process in Egypt, thus leading to the 
restoration of a new type of authoritarianism. 
3.1.1. How did the Egyptian uprising begin?  
Since his accession to power in 1981, Mubarak’s regime had built a corrupt and 
increasingly intolerable economic system. By the end of 2010, economic favoritism strengthened 
through the concentration of political authority in the hands of Mubarak had already worsened 
the economic condition of large segments of the society. Approximately one half of the 
population was living at or under the poverty line and at least 40 percent of the college students 
were unemployed on the eve of the 2011 uprisings.2 Rampant corruption and political repression, 
which had long blocked the ways of political participation, came to an intolerable point for 
Egyptians. National Assembly elections held on November 28 and December 5, 2010 were 
considered clearly rigged. Following the elections, opposition candidates including hundreds of 
Muslim Brotherhood members were subjected to political exclusion and even imprisonment. 
Mubarak and the oligarchy he had long favored “were widely perceived to be treating the 
country as a private farm and the people as their indentured servants.”3 Economic reforms that 
Gamal Mubarak, son of Hosni Mubarak, implemented were only in the interests of those who 
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were close to the regime and significantly reduced the living standards of the majority.4 The 
justice that Egyptians were seeking had long been in favor of the rich and privileged few.  
On the eve of the uprisings, Egyptians began demanding to reformulate the social 
contract between the ruler and the ruled in their country. They came to believe that they could no 
longer tolerate decades-long “politics from above,” which mostly meant poverty, injustices, and 
brutality for them.5 Initial demands on which protesters insisted included: the termination of the 
existing parliament and holding new elections, a two-term limit for the presidency, ending 
emergency laws, dismissing the Interior Minister, Habib al-Adly, who was infamous for his 
brutal policies towards the opposition groups, and improving the economic conditions such as 
increasing the minimum wage to a reasonable level.6 
 Youth activism in the decades preceding the 2011 revolution helped the masses mobilize 
quickly during the uprisings. The groups such as Youth for Change, the April 6 Movement, the 
El Baradei campaign, and We Are All Khaled Said played significant roles in the course of 
events by organizing and managing the uprisings.7 Politically repressed youths who felt that they 
were not represented by the existing political parties found alternative paths to political 
participation. They were less conciliatory towards the incumbent regime and concentrated more 
on fundamental political changes, resisting the ways in which politics had worked for so long in 
Egypt.8 Especially, a group called “April 6 Movement,” which was founded in 2008 during the 
organizing “Textile Workers Strike” on April 6, was highly influential in orchestrating the 
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demonstrations. The use of social media networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube 
created an alternative political space by communication and mobilization of the people. Social 
networking and the Internet in general became critically instrumental in spreading the brutality 
of the regime’s security apparatus, specifically police, and convincing more people to join in the 
demonstrations.9 
 The demonstrations of February 2011 were triggered by a Facebook invitation to 
Egyptians to join in the “Day of Rage” on January 25th, the National Police Day. The choice of 
National Police Day was meaningful and intentional for protesting specifically the police 
brutality across the country. The invitation was successful such that the number of Egyptians 
who gathered at Tahrir Square within a week was more than 200,000 people.10 Yet, although the 
protesters in Egypt demanded jobs, socio-economic dignity, justice, and democracy, they lacked 
a unified leadership or political program, which was later to handicap the construction of post-
Mubarak Egypt.11  
 The lack of leadership led other formerly restricted groups to take part in demonstrations; 
therefore, “the secular elements’” lead in the protests, which was the leading factor of the 
uprisings in the first days, was reduced in the days to come. Indeed, young secular protesters 
may have inflamed the Egyptian uprisings, but a new and powerful actor entered the scene soon: 
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). At the beginning, it was unknown what role they were playing in 
the revolution. The Brotherhood’s Guidance Bureau was cautious at the beginning as to whether 
they should mobilize their members to join in demonstrations shaking the Mubarak’s political 
authority. Considering the long-time political repression the regime had used against the 
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movement, they refrained from encouraging their young cadres because they were not sure what 
direction the demonstrations would take. In case of a possible failure in toppling the regime, the 
Brotherhood would have lost all its networks, economic ties, and even prospective political 
participation channels for a long time, if not forever.12  
 As the number of people protesting Mubarak’s regime increased gradually and the 
prospect of a regime “change” became clear, the leading figures in the Brotherhood revised their 
earlier restrained positions and began openly to encourage their members to participate in the 
protests.13 On January 28th, the Brotherhood publicly proclaimed its support for nation-wide 
protests, which led the regime to act more repressively towards the movement by arresting many 
of its members, including some of the members of the movement’s executive council.14  
 In the first days of the protests, President Hosni Mubarak did not seem to want to step 
down quickly. He ordered the police and the Central Security Forces (CSF) to establish 
barricades and had local security forces shut down access to the Sadat Metro Station in order to 
prevent protesters from mobilizing quickly.15 He also ordered Facebook and Twitter to be 
disabled.16 However, shutting down the Internet and cell phone access across the country did 
little help to Mubarak to cement his authority. Parents who could not reach their children on the 
cell phone due to blockage poured into the streets to look for their children, thus increasing the 
number of people on the ground.17  
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Mubarak later tried to appease the fast-growing crowds. On January 29th, he addressed 
the nation on television and proposed a roadmap for “change.” He made some concessions 
including firing his entire government and appointing his intelligence chief Omar Suleiman as 
the new Vice President, which signaled that his son, Gamal Mubarak, would not be the next 
president.18 Then, Suleiman initiated a “national dialogue” by including the Muslim Brotherhood 
and “loyal opposition figures,” which demonstrators generally opposed in the belief that it would 
turn “public discontent into private pacts.”19 In response, the leading slogan of the streets, 
“Down with the regime!,” nullified these seemingly conciliatory moves.20 The strife between the 
regime forces and the protesters was getting increasingly hostile. When it became certain that the 
regime could not succeed to disperse the crowds, the army entered the scene as the “most 
favorably perceived institution” in the country as the police forces retreated.21  
 As the crowds continued to protest, many fretted that the military might shoot on the 
protesters so as to prevent the crowds from further threatening the regime. However, institutional 
formation of the military in Egypt, like its equivalent in Tunisia, has long been structurally less 
fragmented and based on professionalism as opposed to patrimonialism (which is the case in 
Syria). The important question the Egyptian military faced in the midst of the social unrest was 
whether it would take up arms against the citizens or not. The decision-making process among 
the military elites when ordered to act is usually based on several imperatives such as 
maintaining internal cohesion, discipline, and morale among the corps as well as protecting the 
image, prestige, and national legitimacy of the military in the eyes of the citizens.22 Therefore, 
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firing upon peaceful protesters seemed highly costly for the military’s legitimacy, internal 
cohesion, discipline, and prestige, especially when it became clear that Mubarak’s days in power 
were numbered. During 18 days of the uprisings, Mubarak had appeared on television three 
times to convince the crowds; however, he failed. On February 11th, the Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF), composed of twenty senior generals and led by Field Marshall Mohamed 
Hussein Tantawi, released a communique that called on the regime to recognize the “legitimate 
demands of the protesters,” followed by departure of Mubarak and his family for exile in Sharm 
al-Shaykh.23  
3.2. Post-Regime Breakdown: The SCAF Overseeing the Transition 
 With the breakdown of the three decades-long Mubarak regime, the SCAF emerged as 
the only central authority with the power that could supervise the transition. Stacher (2017) 
points out that the SCAF reached this positon largely because of the neutralization process 
initiated by President Mubarak when the protests broke out. In order to soothe the tension in the 
streets, Mubarak first dismissed neoliberal reformist figures and his inner circle in the 
government and then had his Interior Minister, Habib al-Adly, arrested, which meant that the 
sole institution that could represent the state authority had become the military.24 Two days after 
Mubarak’s resignation, the SCAF abolished the parliament and suspended the constitution, 
which allowed it to make laws during the transitional period.25  
 Shortly after the departure of Mubarak, the military council appointed a committee of 
experts to draft revisions to the 1971 Constitution instead of writing a new one in line with the 
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revolutionary demands.26 Unlike the path pursued in Tunisia, Egypt’s post-revolutionary actors 
(mainly the military officers) chose first to focus on the constitution instead of overseeing the 
country to elections. However, there were still some political forces and movements on the 
streets protesting against the military’s domination of the transitional process. Having realized 
the intensification of critical voices in the streets, the military began to seek partnerships with 
domestic political actors to calm tension, restore order, and demobilize the protests in the 
country.27 
 Two groups of political actors stood out in the post-Mubarak Egypt. The first group was 
composed of the military establishment, the former National Democratic Party (NDP) officials, 
and the bureaucratic elites most notably members of the interior ministry and the judiciary.28 The 
second group was the revisionists who triggered the uprisings that deposed President Mubarak. 
Youth movements, Islamists, and non-Islamist political parties – such as the Wafd, the left-
leaning Tagammu, and the nationalist Dignity Party – formed the second group. Unlike the first 
group, the actors in the second group had leaned towards making a sharp break from the old 
order.29 For them, the actors who represented the old regime had long lost their legitimacy in the 
eyes of Egyptians; therefore, the new political landscape had to respond to public anger at the 
“establishment.” Hence, the SCAF started talks with the opposition actors, most notably the 
Muslim Brotherhood, who appeared the most capable in comparison to other groups rallying 
mass protests. Brownlee et al. (2015) notes, “when it came time for the SCAF to lay down the 
roadmap for the transition, Islamists were granted disproportionate influence.”30  
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The cooperation between the military and the MB seemed like an uneasy one; however, 
each side acted cautiously not to upset the other from the beginning. In accordance with this 
cooperation, Tarek al-Bishri, a prominent MB member, was tasked with chairing the committee 
responsible for amending the Constitution. In addition, the committee never opened the second 
article of the 1971 Constitution up for discussion, which highlighted the centrality of Islamic law 
to legislation.31 The most urgent move for the Islamists, the MB in particular, was to lay down 
the details about the nature of the electoral process as soon as possible and accelerate the pace of 
normalization by returning to a civilian government. Therefore, the MB, along with the Salafists, 
voted “Yes” in the referendum of the constitutional amendments held in March 2011. The result 
of this very first referendum seemed to give a more prominent voice to Islamists, but in fact, it 
provided the military with full legislative and executive authority. As Nathan Brown wrote later, 
“[w]hen voters supported what they were told were ‘amendments,’ the military decided not to 
insert the approved language into the old constitution. Instead, hiding behind the cloak of what 
they called ‘revolutionary legitimacy,’ the generals opted to write a new, temporary 
‘constitutional declaration’ that inserted clauses voters had approved into a forest of other 
articles on how the state would be run during the transition [emphasis added].”32 Through the 
March 30, 2011 declaration (a document of 63 articles) that operated as a de facto constitution, 
which surpassed the 1971 Constitution, the military made its post-Mubarak oversight felt by new 
political actors, “thus setting the dangerous precedent of insisting that the constitution was 
whatever those in power said it was.”33  
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3.3. Opposition Against The Military Rule 
 As the time went on, the hopes for a rapid transition in which the military’s domination 
would gradually fade away disappeared. In contrast, the military officers did not seem eager to 
leave their positions, as they did not abrogate the emergency law that had been in effect since 
1981.34 Article 56, promulgated through the constitutional declaration, was a clear manifestation 
of the military tutelage in the transitional period. According to this article, the SCAF was given 
the right to “issue public policy for the state and the public budget,” “promulgate laws or object 
them,” “appoint the head of the cabinet,” “appoint civilian and military employees,” and “call the 
People’s Assembly and the Shura Council to enter into normal session, adjourn, or hold an extra 
session.”35 
 Having been disappointed by the way in which the transition was administered by the 
military officers, many groups that had sparked the uprisings returned to the streets to protest the 
military rule this time. Non-Islamist youth “reclaimed” the central squares, seeking the trial of 
police officers responsible for the killings during January and February 2011.36 Divisions had 
further deepened between the SCAF and the secular/liberal bloc, and most notably, between 
liberals and Islamists. On the MB’s part, the Grand Bureau was picturing the post-Mubarak street 
protests as fitna-inducing actions.37 In a counterbalance demonstration (“Friday of Stability”) in 
July 2011, Islamists sided with the SCAF, calling for the urgency to halt the worrisome “street-
level security situation” in the country and to put an end to protests (called the “Friday of 
Determination”) against the military.38  
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 In the light of worsening tension and increasing polarization between the liberal bloc and 
Islamists, the former group had demanded that the SCAF should designate new “supra-
constitutional principles” that would prevent Islamists from crafting an “Islamic” constitution.39 
Having realized its ability to dominate the electoral process, the MB kept its silence and stayed 
away from any revolutionary “confrontations” on the ground. In the meantime, the organization 
made a strategic move: it adopted a militarist-nationalist discourse that would picture non-
Islamists who contested the military rule in the interim as “counter-revolutionaries.” In so doing, 
it reinforced its unwritten pact with the military and made “others’” criticisms against the 
organization mostly ignored.40 Tugal (2016) explains how the essence of the “patriotic pact” 
between the military and the MB was perceived among the liberal and leftist groups as the 
elections loomed nearer, “The 6 April group and other revolutionary groups lamented that the 
military and the Brotherhood were cooperating to liquidate them: one was arresting them while 
the other was declaring them to be traitors.”41  
Many Egyptians did not view the military’s active involvement in the transitional process 
in the early months following the Mubarak’s overthrow to be a problem. “The army and the 
people are one” was the common motto of the streets as the military officers refused to resort to 
force against demonstrators in their contest with the autocratic regime. However, this euphoria 
soon dissolved as the military leaders began to hint at their actual agenda. As Jason Brownlee 
writes, “the country’s generals . . . did not return to the barracks, repeal the Emergency Law (a 
core aim of January 25th organizers), or transfer executive power to a civilian-led transitional 
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committee.”42 As demonstrations continued, the SCAF began arresting and detaining 
revolutionary activists on the streets demanding the end of military rule; however, the brutality, 
misconduct, the abuses of security forces had not been properly investigated.43 The Maspero 
protests on October 9, 2011, leaving at least 25 Coptic Christian protesters dead and 325 injured 
during a protest against the burning of a church in Aswan, became the milestone of the changing 
perception of the military.44 David Kirkpatrick went so far as to say when he reported from Cairo 
that “the brutal crackdown had finally extinguished the public’s faith in the ruling military 
council as the guardian of a peaceful transition to democracy.”45  
3.4. Parliamentary Elections in The “Protected” Transition 
 The military’s firm hold on power seemed more obvious when the then-deputy Prime 
Minister Ali al-Selmy released the “Declaration of the Fundamental Principles of the New 
Egyptian State” (so-called the Selmy document) on November 1, 2011, which intended to guide 
the constitution-drafting process following the parliamentary elections.46 At first glance, it 
seemed that these “supra-constitutional principles” were mostly in accordance with the demands 
of non-Islamists as the document was constructed in a way to prevent Islamists from 
monopolizing the exercise of political power through an electoral process. The declaration 
identified Egypt as a “democratic civil state which is based on citizenship and on the rule of law.  
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It respects pluralism and guarantees freedom, justice equality and equal opportunity to all 
citizens without exception [emphasis added].”47 However, the document also contained 
provisions that would be welcomed by Islamists such as adopting Islamic jurisprudence as the 
main source of legislation, while at the same time giving non-Muslims a right to follow their 
own religious principles in managing familial and religious affairs.48  
What was certain of the Selmy document was that it enabled the military to gain the full 
monopoly over its interests. Article 9 of the document, one of the most controversial provisions, 
stipulated that the SCAF was “solely responsible” in discussing any matters relating to the armed 
forces, including determining its annual budget and declaring war, to the exclusion of any 
civilian supervision.49 The document also gave the full authority to the SCAF to “determine” if 
any provision during the constitution-writing process opposes “the basic tenets of the state and of 
Egyptian society, to the rights and public freedoms which have been provided for in successive 
Egyptian constitutions, including the constitutional declaration issued on 30 March 2011 and the 
constitutional declarations that were issued since.”50 Through these “supra-constitutional 
principles,” the SCAF was given the privilege to dominate the selection of the members of the 
committee authorized to write the new constitution, as the elected assembly would nominate only 
20 members of the committee composed of 100 members, a stark contrast to the “Constitutional 
Declaration” issued on March 30th.51  
As the document weakened the role of the parliament in establishing the principles of the 
constitution-writing by reserving more autonomy to mostly the remnants of the old regime, it 
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drew serious objections from the Islamist bloc (mainly the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis), 
which were expected to secure more seats in the new parliament.52 Joined by youth revolutionary 
groups, Islamists began to mobilize the grassroots to take Cairo’s streets again to protest against 
the Selmy document, insisting that the SCAF drop the declaration. Having calculated the 
potential gains in the upcoming elections, the Brotherhood cadres made a strategic move, 
blending their criticisms to the document with an anti-military discourse. As Brownlee et al. 
(2015) write, “the Brotherhood made common cause with these [mostly youth] groups by 
emphasizing that its opposition to the Silmi document was based on its provisions regarding 
military autonomy, and not solely on the fact that the declaration would have stripped the 
Islamists of the ability to determine the shape of the new constitution [emphasis added].”53 
Confronted by escalating street demonstrations, the SCAF compromised (1) approving the 
resignation of the then-interim Prime Minister Esam Sharaf and (2) pledging to hold the 
presidential elections in June 2012, originally scheduled in April 2013.54 Consequently, the 
document was revoked and the MB strengthened its public image using the “anti-military” card 
on the eve of the elections. 
Together with their long-entrenched religious and social appeal, the MB and the Salafis, 
“outsiders” of the Egypt politics prior to 2011, dominated the elections for the lower and upper 
houses of the legislature. The elections took place from November 28, 2011 to January 11, 2012. 
The first largest bloc “Democratic Alliance”, which was largely dominated by the Muslim 
Brotherhood's Hizb al-Hurriya wa al-‘Adalah (the Freedom and Justice Party), secured 
approximately 46 percent of the total seats in the lower house (the People’s Assembly) and 58 
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percent in the upper house (the Shura Council). The second largest bloc “Islamic Alliance,” 
which was led by more conservative Salafist Hizb al-Nur (the Party of Light), garnered 25 
percent of the seats in the lower house and 25 percent of the competed seats in the upper house.55 
Together, Islamists had the majority in both houses by winning more than 80 percent of the seats 
in the upper house and at least 70 percent in the lower house. The non-Islamist parties won less 
than 30 percent of the seats in the parliament, which came as a surprise to many analysts, since 
the 2011 uprisings in Egypt were originally instigated by non-Islamist segments of the society 
while Islamists had acted cautiously and stayed uninvolved in the protests in the beginning. 
3.5. Power Struggles Between The Military and Islamists 
 By winning the majority of the seats in the two houses of the parliament, Islamists 
showed that they were the most powerful electoral force in Egypt. However, the SCAF continued 
to hold the political power since, through the March 30th Constitutional Declaration, the military 
had deprived the prospective parliament of establishing a government and passing a law without 
the SCAF’s consent.56 The MB came to a position to rule the country, but its political capacities 
were restrained by the military’s tight supervision. Though the MB asked for the appointment of 
the new government to replace Kamal al-Ganzuri’s cabinet, appointed in December 2011, in line 
with the electoral results, the SCAF acted reluctantly, continuing to determine foreign and 
domestic policies in the transition. However, the political predominance of the military was 
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temporary since it would not have any “supervisory” role in the transition and the constitution-
writing process once the presidential elections were held.57  
 Having realized that the SCAF was unwilling to hand over its political power, the MB 
began to reconsider its earlier decision not to run for the presidency. Shortly before President 
Mubarak’s removal, the MB had made it clear that the party would not nominate a candidate in 
presidential elections, a cautious move that aimed to avoid a backlash from non-Islamists. 
However, the circumstances had now changed as the party had demonstrated an impressive 
electoral performance; thus, the earlier self-restraint position was suddenly abandoned. “When 
the victory became an option,”58 the MB calculated that the party would attain real power only 
by holding the presidential office. On the other hand, the MB was obsessed with the fear of the 
return to the ancien regime. Therefore, they figured that they would only thwart this possibility 
of reversion by chairing the highest office in the country.59  
Their fear turned out to be real when Ahmed Shafiq, Hosni Mubarak’s last prime 
minister, announced his candidacy in February 2012.60 In April, Omar Suleiman, the former 
Intelligence Chief and Egypt’s last-serving vice president, officially proclaimed his bid for the 
presidency, but was later disqualified by the High Judicial Elections Commission because of 
being 31 signatures short in his application.61 To counter their candidacies, the MB dominated 
parliament passed a political exclusion law that would have prevented any Mubarak-era notables 
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from running for the presidency.62 However, the law was ruled unconstitutional and suspended 
by the Supreme Constitutional Court, thus enabling the former regime figures to participate in 
the elections.63 For their part, the Brotherhood leadership nominated two candidates, due to the 
fear that one of their nominees might be banned from running because of the strict legal 
requirements;64 Khairat al-Shatir, the group’s deputy leader, and Mohamed Morsi, the leader of 
the Freedom and Justice Party. Shortly thereafter, the Elections Commission disqualified al-
Shatir because of having a criminal record that dated back to 2008.65  
 Al-Shatir’s disqualification was followed by the judiciary’s disbanding of the hundred-
member committee (half of which was selected from the Brotherhood-dominated parliament) 
responsible for constitution-writing. The legal rationale was twofold: firstly, the committee was 
ruled unrepresentative as many non-Islamists boycotted it; secondly, the SCAF’s interim 
constitution did not openly stipulate that the parliamentarians could appoint themselves to the 
committee.66 As the presidential elections loomed nearer, the court’s decision could have led 
Islamists and non-Islamists to form a consensual committee in the drafting process. However, it 
only helped the divide between the Islamists and revolutionary groups further deepen as 
Islamists formed a new “but similar” committee, that would again give them predominance to 
unilaterally oversee the constitution-making.67 
3.6. Presidential Elections and Its Aftermath 
 The first round of the presidential elections was held on May 23-24, 2012, with only 
thirteen candidates qualified to run. The two leading candidates who achieved to proceed to the 
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runoff were Mohamed Morsi, the Brotherhood’s second pick, and Ahmad Shafiq, an old-regime 
loyalist who served as the last prime minister. Morsi received around 25 percent of the popular 
vote in the first round, with Shafiq coming in second at 24 percent.68 The outcome in the first 
round showed that around 50 percent of the eligible voters did not vote either for Morsi or 
Shafiq, indicating that a sizeable number of Egyptians did not believe these two candidates 
actually represented a “real political change.” However, only the candidates with the most deep-
seated socio-political networks, namely Morsi and Shafiq, could achieve to reach the highest 
voting rates.69 
 Only two days before the second round of the presidential election, the judiciary made its 
appearance on the political stage again when it dissolved the country’s first democratically 
elected parliament. The electoral law, overseeing the November-January parliamentary elections, 
ruled that two-thirds of the parliamentary seats would be contested by party-affiliated candidates, 
with individual candidates allocated to one-third of the seats. However, the court deemed that the 
law was unconstitutional, since it allowed party-affiliated candidates to run for the seats that 
needed to be filled by individual candidates.70 The decision was accepted as one of the major 
setbacks to Egypt’s political transition, as it was assumed that the military was behind the ruling. 
The SCAF’s reasoning was twofold: firstly, even if Morsi won the election, he would lose his 
base in the Islamist-dominated parliamentary; should Shafiq win, as a former regime notable, he 
would ensure the “restoration” of the ancien regime without being shackled by the parliament, 
largely controlled by the Islamists.71 
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 Alarmed at the prospect that the military would never step aside and let the civilians 
oversee the transition, the MB supporters and other revolutionary groups together raised serious 
concerns about the SCAF’s increasingly stiffening supervision of the transition. Mohamed El 
Baradei, a former head of the United Nations Nuclear Energy Agency, stated, “the election of a 
president in the absence of a constitution and a parliament is the election of a president with 
powers that not even the most entrenched dictatorships have known.”72 The judiciary’s 
independence was also at issue as the military put pressure on the court to overrule a new 
exclusion law that would prevent Shafiq from running in the runoff, thus clearing the way for 
him.73 
 Amid the political turbulence, the second round of the presidential elections was held on 
June 16-17th, 2012. Egyptians went to polling stations in an atmosphere in which the divide 
between the Islamists and non-Islamists gravely grew and no consensus on the procedure of 
drafting the new constitution was reached among political elites. On June 17th, the last day of the 
election, the SCAF struck at the MB again when the council released a Constitutional Addendum 
to March 30th Constitutional Declaration, which aimed at strengthening the military’s autonomy 
from any civilian supervision.74 The Addendum established a strong role for the military to veto 
(if deemed necessary) any presidential decisions about army affairs.75 The SCAF also assumed 
the role of the disbanded parliament, so as to legislate until a new parliament was elected (Article 
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56 B). According to the declaration, in the case of the future constituent assembly’s failure to 
complete the drafting process, the SCAF would appoint the new 100-member constituent 
assembly, tasked with writing the country’s new constitution (Article 60 B). What appeared 
certain in the light of this new declaration was that the military wanted to continue to be the 
primary decision-maker in Egypt’s political landscape, regardless of who would win the 
presidency. 
 Throughout the following week, Egypt had witnessed several meetings and bargains 
among Islamists and the military officers overseeing the power transition after the presidential 
elections, despite mutual suspicions of both political actors having a long but controversial 
past.76 One week after the second round of the presidential elections took place, on June 24th, 
Farouk Sultan, the head of the Presidential Elections Committee, announced that Morsi had won 
51.7 percent of the popular vote, thus, becoming the first civilian president of Egypt.77 Morsi was 
elected president when there was a political uncertainty threatening Egypt’s transition. 
Therefore, Egyptians expected to see this uncertainty soon resolved and Egypt’s political agenda 
normalized.  
3.7. Islamists’ Challenging The “Establishment” 
 When Morsi took over the office on June 30, 2012, it was certain that his presidential 
powers would continue to be challenged by both the military, determined to preserve its own 
prerogatives, and the judiciary. Sitting at the helm of the country, Morsi now concentrated on 
reinstating his authority by countering these well-established institutions, widely seen as 
remnants of the old regime. First, he ordered the Islamist-majority parliament, that was annulled 
by the judiciary on June 14th (which was widely accepted that it was the SCAF’s decision), “back 
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to work.”78 He also appointed Hesham Kandil, a former irrigation and water resources minister, 
to form the new cabinet on July 24th, which came as a surprise to many observers since he was a 
politically unknown but clearly a technocrat figure.79 Morsi maintained this strategy of 
appointing technocrats, rather than the MB members, to his cabinet, in order to show his leaning 
on sharing power with revolutionary actors.80 His challenge was the military, and its long-
standing predominance in Egyptian politics, which confined his legislative and presidential 
powers through constitutional declarations announced in the interim period. 
 The most decisive move of Morsi was to ask the defense minister, Muhammad Hussein 
Tantawi, the army chief of staff, and Sami Anan to resign, on August 12th. It was broadly seen as 
a milestone in Egypt’s political power relations; the military had long enjoyed an institutional 
autonomy and organized the political realm in Egypt, but, Morsi now began to redesign the 
“core” of political power in Egypt. He substituted Tantawi with current military intelligence 
chief Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, a reportedly pious Muslim.81 He also overruled the legal restrictions 
imposed upon him by the military, passed by popular referendum in March 2011, and assumed 
significant executive and legislative powers through a counter-declaration.82 This declaration 
also granted Morsi the authority to form a new Constituent Assembly to carry out the drafting of 
the new constitution in three weeks, if the current assembly did not complete its responsibilities 
on time.83  
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 Morsi then turned his attention to the judiciary. He appointed Mahmoud Mekki, a pro-
reform judge, as his vice president, a move deemed as neutralization of the opposition from the 
judiciary.84 He also appointed state prosecutor Abdel Meguid Mahmoud as ambassador to 
Vatican, having regard for revolutionary demands that claimed that Mahmoud had not properly 
done his job in investigating those involved in violent activities against demonstrations during 
the 25 January revolution.85 However, Mahmoud declared, “I remain in my post. According to 
the law, a judicial body cannot be dismissed by an executive authority;”86 ultimately, he kept his 
office after he met with Morsi and agreed on annulling his appointment.  
To some, Morsi’s steps were necessary to curb the influences of the old regime actors on 
socio-political and economic realms in Egypt. To others, although “de-militarization of the state” 
was the right path to consolidate civilian authority after Mubarak’s fall, it was unknown whether 
the new political power center would now be the president, and if so, how his executive and 
legislative powers would be checked.87 
3.8. Transition Torn Between The Islamists and The Old State “Establishment” 
 Having won the parliamentary and presidential elections, Egypt’s Islamists believed that 
the control was now in their hands and the new order should be established in a majoritarian 
fashion instead of a pluralist one. In his steps against the entrenched military establishment and 
the judiciary, Morsi did overlook the concerns of most non-Islamists about the emergence of a 
new type of political power monopolization, which was most clearly observed during the 
constitution-drafting process. As noted earlier, the Constituent Assembly reopened after Morsi’s 
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accession to the presidency and the committee (which the Islamists dominated) tasked with the 
constitution-drafting returned to its workings. However, due to the contentious makeup of the 
committee, most non-Islamist groups began to feel that their demands were driven out of the 
constitution-making process, making them more critical of the once-promised “inclusiveness” of 
the new constitution.88 Out of the fear that the court might overturn the constitutional process by 
disbanding the Constituent Assembly, Morsi issued another declaration on November 22nd. With 
this new declaration, he removed his executive and legislative authorities from judicial 
oversight.89  
 This move sparked a new wave of protests across Egypt. Morsi’s presidency suddenly 
became the focal point of the protests, gathering Egyptians from a wide political spectrum 
including liberals, leftists, and even old regime supporters. Forming the National Salvation Front, 
the oppositionists demanded that Morsi nullify the declaration and that the current Constituent 
Assembly be dissolved and replaced with a more representative one.90 Amid this political tumult, 
Morsi stepped back and reversed most of contentious parts of the declaration on December 8th; 
however, he did not consent to the postponement of the scheduled referendum on the new 
constitution.91 
 The committee completed the constitution draft at the end of November, one that 
international observers had found mostly majoritarian. Liberals and leftist groups expressed fears 
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that the draft lacked inclusiveness. The draft, in general, emphasized the religious character of 
the state; thus, failing to embrace the spirit of the revolution.92 Ahmed and Capoccia (2014) 
notes the other problematic facets of the draft constitution: “hindering the rights of women and 
religious minorities, undermining the independence of workers, and limiting speech through 
censorship laws.”93 The assembly rushed the document to referendum without leaving Egyptians 
sufficient time to debate over it. The referendum was held between December 15 and December 
22 and passed with around 64 percent; however, a sizeable portion of the society boycotted it, 
which dropped the turnout to as low as 33 percent.94  
3.9. The End of The First Democratic Experiment 
Polarization between Morsi’s Islamist supporters and their opponents gradually increased 
throughout the early months of 2013. Many non-Islamists, including religious minorities, feared 
that their freedoms were beginning to be limited by the MB’s majoritarianism. Public approval 
of the constitution failed to ease the tension in the society but instead further inflamed the 
protests. In April 2013, a group of young activists, mostly members of the Kefaya Movement, 
who were displeased with the MB’s governance started a new campaign called “Tamarrud” or 
“Rebel.” They began collecting signatures in 19 out of 27 governorates in Egypt in support for a 
petition calling for the withdrawal of confidence in President Morsi and insisting that early 
elections be held.95 By the late June, it was reported that the campaign had collected around 15 
million signatures revoking confidence in Morsi. This surpassed the 13.2 million votes that 
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Morsi had garnered in the 2012 presidential elections.96 Tamarrud called for mass protests on the 
anniversary of Morsi’s inauguration on June 30, demanding Morsi’s resignation.97 In response to 
Tamarrud campaign, Morsi supporters launched the campaign called “Tagarod” or “Impartiality” 
and they deemed anti-Morsi demonstrations unconstitutional since the president held electoral 
legitimacy.98 
 On June 23rd, fearing that protests and counter-protests would drag Egypt into a civil war, 
the Defense Minister Sisi warned that the military would intervene to prevent further internal 
conflict, calling all political factions for reaching consensus.99 On June 26th, Morsi made a 
speech in which he admitted his mistakes during the transitional process, but he did not offer 
genuine concessions to opposition groups during his two and a half hour-long speech.100 His 
speech did not ease the tension surrounding Egypt’s streets. On June 30th, millions of Egyptians 
poured into the streets to demand his resignation. The record states that it was the largest mass 
demonstration since Mubarak’s ouster.101 In response to exponentially increasing anti-Morsi 
demonstrations nationwide, the MB cadres launched their pro-government demonstrations, 
which ultimately led to violent confrontations between the two camps, leaving 24 people dead 
and many injured.102  
 On July 1st, Defense Minister Sisi made his “48-hours ultimatum” calling the president to 
take “requisite steps” to settle the national crisis and to heed people’s demands, including the 
formation of a national unity government and the review of the new constitution; otherwise, the 
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military would lay down a political roadmap for the county’s transition.103 However, Morsi 
refused to concede in a televised speech by which he addressed the nation on July 2nd. He 
underscored his electoral “legitimacy” throughout his speech, and said, “We have to prove to the 
world that we are capable of democracy...peacefully, we protect [democratic] 
legitimacy...legitimacy is our only safeguard from future faults...I do not accept anyone saying 
anything or taking any steps against legitimacy; this is completely out of the question.”104 Yet, at 
the same time, his presidency was on the edge of being overthrown. The next day, endorsed by 
senior religious figures as well as elites from a wide political spectrum (such as Mohamed 
ElBaradei), al-Sisi announced that the country’s first democratically elected president would be 
dismissed from his office, the recently approved constitution suspended, and an interim 
government would be formed to draft a new constitution.105  
3.10. The Aftermath of The Military Coup: Reversion to Ancien Regime 
 Millions of Egyptians mobilized to oust their first democratically elected president. 
Although Morsi was not the type of president that they hoped for when toppling Mubarak, his 
ousting with a popularly supported military coup truly damaged the notion of electoral 
legitimacy and ended the transitional experience in Egypt. One thing was certain: with the ouster 
of Morsi, the Egyptian military has restored its autonomy across the country with the support of 
many Egyptians who preferred a “return to normalcy.”106 
A sizeable number of Egyptians believed that the military would restore stability and 
meet urgent economic needs of the society. However, what replaced Morsi’s governance was 
                                                          
103 Matthew Weaver, Paul Owen and Tom McCarthy, “Egypt protests: army issues 48-hour ultimatum - as it 
happened,” The Guardian, July 1, 2013. 
104 Osman El Sharnoubi, “Egypt's Morsi defies calls to step down, offers opposition partial concessions,” Ahram 
Online, July 3, 2013. 
105 David Kirkpatrick, “Army Ousts Egypt’s President; Morsi Is Taken Into Military Custody,” The New York Times, 
July 3, 2013.  
106 Stacher (2017): 418. 
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grim due to the bloodshed it caused. Pro-Morsi supporters organized large peaceful sit-ins and 
demonstrations at Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda squares, condemning the military takeover 
and calling for restoration of Morsi’s presidency. The Human Rights Watch reported that more 
than one thousand Morsi supporters had been killed by the security forces during the period 
between July-August 2013.107 
 The military-led government, especially the interior ministry, returned back to Mubarak-
era practices such as shutting down Islamist broadcasters and taking “all necessary measures” 
against the Muslim Brotherhood activities.108 However, Morsi’s overthrow did not lead to what 
some Egyptians hoped for as the circle of repression gradually extended over non-Islamist 
activists. Morsi’s rivals soon became critical of the military; they thought that the military was 
using the situation to extend the scope of repression. By the end of the year, the interim 
president, Adly Mansour, passed a new “anti-protest” law that gave local authorities the right to 
prohibit legal mass demonstrations.109 In the shadow of this law, pro-democracy activists 
gathered in Tahrir square and other squares nationwide to celebrate the third anniversary of the 
revolution, but the security forces brutally interfered in the protests; consequently, 49 people 
were killed, 247 injured, and above 1000 arrested in the governorates of Minya, Cairo, Giza, and 
Alexandria.110 
The laws enacted throughout 2013-2014 gave the military courts the privilege to execute 
jurisdiction over civilians.111 On January 18, 2014, Egypt’s new constitution was approved with 
                                                          
107 “All According to Plan: The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt,” Human Rights Watch, 
August 12, 2014. 
108 Brown (2013): 50. 
109 Bassiouni (2016): 68; see also Patrick Kingsley, “Egypt's interim president Adly Mansour signs 'anti-protest 
law,” The Guardian, November 24, 2013. 
110 Fady Ashraf and Ali Omar, “Update: At least 49 killed, 247 wounded and over 1000 arrested in 25 January 
anniversary,” Daily News Egypt, January 26, 2014, also cited in Bassiouni (2016): 68 
111 Bassiouni (2016): 70. 
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an overwhelming 98.1 percent after the interim government’s month long-campaign mobilizing 
Egyptians to vote “Yes.”112 Through this new constitution, the military courts have become 
“equivalent” to civilian courts.113 According to the new constitution, the military budget has been 
kept beyond any civilian supervision and the defense minister is stipulated to be appointed by the 
military.114 As Brown and Dunne noted when they wrote on the military’s new status (different 
from the 2012 constitution) in the draft constitution, “It is no longer treated as part of the 
executive branch of government but rather a branch unto itself.”115 Almost one year after Morsi’s 
ouster, al-Sisi, who orchestrated the overthrow of Morsi, was elected president with 96.1 percent 
of the popular vote in May 2014.116 
 As noted throughout this section, in the aftermath of the 25 January revolution, 
revolutionary actors had not agreed upon a transitional roadmap that would oversee Egypt to a 
more accountable and inclusive regime. Instead, socio-political polarization that emerged after 
Mubarak’s fall had furthered such that a democratic compromise did not occur among opposing 
political actors. The revolution that ousted three decades-long authoritarianism resulted in a 
military coup that left hundreds of people dead and thousands injured and many others arrested. 
It would be too simplistic to claim that al-Sisi’s election after the coup has simply led to the 
“civilianization” of the regime, because it has not, given that the military has remained as the 
leading political actor in Egypt and kept its political and economic prerogatives.117  
                                                          
112 “Table: Official results of Egypt's 2014 constitutional referendum,” Ahram Online, January 19, 2014.  
113 Bassiouni (2016): 70. 
114 Mona Salem, “Egypt’s draft constitution consolidates army power,” The Daily Star, December 3, 2013. 
115 Nathan Brown and Michele Dunne, “Egypt’s Draft Constitution Rewards the Military and Judiciary,” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, December 4, 2013. 
116 Patrick Kingsley, “Abdel Fatah al-Sisi won 96.1% of vote in Egypt presidential election, say officials,” The 
Guardian, June 3, 2014. 
117 When asked about the military’s central role in Egypt’s politics after the coup, Hazem Kandil responded, “There 
is no question that the military has returned in force to the heart of the regime, in ways that are causing all kinds of 
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CHAPTER IV 
4.1. Pathways of Democratization in the MENA 
The Arab Uprisings were believed to bring about main changes in the region’s political 
landscape. The masses targeted the decades-long undemocratic rule in the expectation that what 
would replace it would be a more accountable and pluralist governance. Yet, out of the six 
countries that were shaken by the uprisings, in only two of them (Tunisia and Egypt), the 
autocrat was deposed and the revolutionary actors went to the ballot box without any incidents. 
In other cases, the initial outcomes of the uprisings were as follows: the restoration of the old 
order (Yemen), the repression of the protests (Bahrain), and civil war (Libya and Syria). 
Considering Brownlee et al. (2015: 171)’s conceptualization regarding the phases of democratic 
transition (completion and maintenance), the cases of Tunisia and Egypt completed the first 
phase (completion) of their political transitions (Diagram 4.1).  
                             Tunisia 
                           Egypt 
                           Libya 
                            Yemen 
                                                             
                          Elected 
                          Government 
                  
                                           (Yes) Tunisia                       (No) Yemen        
                                           (Yes) Egypt 
                                           (Yes) Libya                 
 
                                            State  
                                                                                                   Capacity  
 
                                                               (Effective)  Tunisia                      (Ineffective) Libya 
                                                               (Effective)  Egypt  
 
                                                                        Military  
                                                                     Intervention                                                                          
 
                        (No) Tunisia         (Yes) Egypt 
   Diagram 4.1: Transitional Outcomes in Cases of Regime Breakdown, Source: Brownlee et al. (2015): 174. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
tension…Sisi has surrounded himself with former military men, just as Nasser did; these men left their Army posts 
very recently, and still have close ties with the military. In security, as we have seen, the Army has resumed its old 
role in domestic surveillance and repression, while in the economic field, after years of privatization and economic 
restructuring under the old regime, we now have a hybrid economy in which major state-run projects are largely 
controlled and coordinated by the military.” See Hazem Kandil, “Sisi’s Egypt,” New Left Review 102, November-
December 2016. 
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Scholars of the MENA politics have debated the fundamental socio-political reasons that 
led to the Arab Spring. Unlike them, I aimed to examine the post-Arab Spring trajectories in this 
study, hoping to identify the pathways of democratic transition in the countries that had long 
been ruled under authoritarian rulers. Therefore, the main focus of this study is the second phase 
(maintenance), in other words, how the countries in transition manage to consolidate their 
transitions and hold on to it.  
 
What Role do 
Oppositionists 
Have in Interim 
Government? 
Is Elected 
Government 
Established? 
Do Oppositions 
Have a Role in 
Determining 
Electoral 
Institutions? 
Does the Elected 
Government Have 
de facto 
Authority? 
Do Elected 
Institutions Hold? 
Tunisia 
Significant. Though 
both legislative and 
executive power 
were claimed by the 
interim government 
that was headed by 
members of Ben 
Ali’s ruling party, 
oppositionists 
claimed significant 
de facto (and later, 
de jure) power 
through the High 
Commission for the 
fulfillment of 
Revolutionary 
Goals 
Yes. October 2011 
elections to 
constituent 
assembly gave rise 
to democratically-
legitimated 
legislature and 
executive 
Total. High 
Authority for 
Elections (ISIE) 
constituted by 
oppositionist-
dominated HCFRG 
Yes. Yes. 
Egypt 
Limited. After 
Mubarak’s 
overthrow, 
executive and 
legislative powers 
are claimed by the 
Supreme Council of 
Armed Forces 
Partially. 
Parliamentary 
elections completed 
in January 2012. 
Abrogated in June 
2012. Presidential 
elections completed 
in June 2012. 
Presidency claims 
legislative authority 
in August 2012 
Limited. Electoral 
rules set by 
military-led interim 
government; 
oversight vested in 
judicial bodies 
Yes. No. June 2012 
parliament 
dissolved by court 
order; military coup 
of July 3, 2013 
brings end to 
democratically 
elected presidency 
Table 4.1: Features of the Transition Process in Tunisia and Egypt, Retrieved from Brownlee et al. (2015): 166. 
 
Table 4.1 shows the transitional trajectories of Tunisia and Egypt following the departure 
of authoritarian rulers in 2011. In the beginning, both countries seemed to have followed a 
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similar path. The initial political opening generated by the regime breakdown was deemed 
crucial by the formerly underrepresented segments of the society, and even politically restricted 
actors (most importantly, Islamists groups). Nevertheless, as time went on, the transitional 
processes in these two cases starkly differed from one another.  
Over six years after the uprisings, only Tunisia has achieved to complete and maintain its 
political transition from authoritarianism, establishing a functioning, albeit fragile, democratic 
system in which the political leaders are held accountable for their political actions. The country 
has promulgated many laws for the protection and enhancement of the political and civil liberties 
within this period. Apart from other significant reasons, sincere cooperation among the opposing 
political actors (most importantly, between seculars and Islamists) has played a pivotal role in 
enabling the country’s transition to proceed. Although continuing economic problems and 
security issues still show potential to compromise some of the democratic gains, political actors 
and state institutions respect the dynamics of democratic governance.  
By contrast, in Egypt, with the overthrow of the first democratically elected President 
Mohamed Morsi through a military coup d’état in 2013, Egyptians had witnessed the legislative 
body of the state kept dissolved until early 2016, after parliamentary elections were finally held 
in late 2015 (from October 17th to December 2nd). The military also suspended the constitution 
adopted in early 2013 and replaced it with the current constitution in January 2014 that granted 
more autonomy to the security apparatus of the state (military and police forces). The Freedom in 
the World 2016 report evaluated the political and civil liberties in Egypt as follows, “The 
government harshly restricted dissent and assembly by activists from across the political 
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spectrum during the year. The media were also targeted, with authorities harassing and 
sometimes jailing journalists who reported on political opposition of any kind.”1 
How can we explain the divergence in the transitional outcomes in these two cases? In 
this study, I argue that one cannot confine democratization process in a fixed theoretical 
framework, an approach largely followed by earlier generations of democratization study; it 
instead is an open-ended, complex, and dynamic process. If democracy itself can be explained as 
a “contextual” and “deontological” variable,2 why do scholars continue to explain 
democratization as a fixed and linear process by idealizing the socio-political conditions that 
made democracy possible in the West? We should remind ourselves that non-Western countries 
grapple with their own complex historical and socio-political difficulties, which are likely to 
complicate their transitions. For this reason, it is unreasonable to situate democratic transitions in 
the West and in the MENA region on the same playing field.3 A useful explanation of 
democratization should refrain from assumptions favoring “pre-determinedness” and be instead 
evaluated contextually. Rather than setting a “rigid” democratization paradigm, which is 
supposed to be valid under any differing socio-political circumstances, I agree with Ahmed and 
Capoccia (2014)’s argument offering an approach to democratization that highlights “regional 
specifics” or that considers “particular modalities” peculiar to every region per se would provide 
                                                          
1 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 Report. 
2 Whitehead (2002): 26. 
3 For example, Brownlee et al. (2013) holds a minimalist approach when they define “regime change” as “the 
ousting of an authoritarian ruler and his inner circle,” asserting the importance of region-level considerations. They 
acknowledge their conceptualization of regime change is narrow, but they point out that setting a high requirement 
of democratic transition for Arab countries that had experienced the Arab Spring would not provide us with any 
cases of regime change. Furthermore, a similar argument can be made for the allegedly causal relationship between 
democracy and economic development. As noted earlier, Lipset (1959) holds the thesis that the wealthier the 
country is, the more possible it will have democratic governance. It is apparent that he had the “Western” experience 
in mind, idealizing it and expecting it to be copied by prospective democracies. However, his thesis does not 
“travel” well outside the Western world. For example, it does not explain why Libya has failed to make transition 
towards a democratic form of governance after the Arab Spring although it is one of the oil-rich countries in MENA.  
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us with fostering insights into examining differing national pathways of regime change.4 
Therefore, we should investigate a set of factors and examine actor-level behaviors, which I 
suggest will reflect the key aspects of transitions in particular contexts.5 This position is in line 
with Laurence Whitehead’s argument suggesting an “interpretavist” perspective, which excludes 
spurious rigor and indefensible assertions of causality and focuses on “transformative” and 
“persuasive” elements of democratization reflective to different cases.6 Leonardo Morlino agrees 
with Whitehead when he states that “any attempt to establish general patterns of transitions in 
connection with definite explanatory factors is bound to fail.”7  
With that in mind, I propose that the macro variables that generate a democratic transition 
or that lead to an authoritarian restoration must be investigated contextually. The post-Arab 
Spring political transformation serves an instructive platform to examine the prospects and perils 
of a democratic transition. As stated before, four key factors have proved critical for a sound 
explanation of democratization experiments in the political systems affected by the uprisings: the 
regime type (the way the regime is structured), democratic compromise among elites, moderation 
of Islamist parties, and the level of civil activism. The present study suggests that none of these 
major variables can suffice by themselves to explain the post-Arab Spring political transitions; it 
would be misleading to consider one variable (e.g. the regime type) to the exclusion of the other 
(e.g. moderation of Islamist parties). For example, the variable moderation of Islamist parties 
must be accompanied by the other three variables. I have tried to assess all these seemingly 
divergent variables, expecting that they could provide us with different components of a whole 
                                                          
4 Ahmed and Capoccia (2014): 14. 
5 For a critique of localization of democracy, see Philippe C. Schmitter, “The Third Wave. Democratization in the 
Late Twentieth Century by Samuel P. Huntington,” The Review of Politics 55 (2), 1993: 350. 
6 Whitehead (2002): 34-35. 
7 Leonardo Morlino, “Transitions to Democracy: What Theory to Grasp Complexities,” Working Paper, Luiss 
Academy, 2014: 7. 
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picture of democratic transition. How these elements play a part in facilitating a transition from 
authoritarianism or derailing the process will be further addressed in regard to the case studies of 
Tunisia and Egypt. 
4.1.1. Institutional Explanation: The Formation of The State  
 The strength of the existing state structure at the time the uprisings broke out is a valid 
indicator to explain what separates the cases of Tunisia and Egypt from other cases of regime 
breakdowns, that is, Libya and Yemen. The rulers of Libya and Yemen had constructed the state 
institutions and bureaucracy along the lines of patrimonial or charismatic leadership, with the 
identity groups played against one another to curb the “favored” ones’ “anti-regime” sentiments. 
Thus, this “sensitive” balance, which they had long preserved, collapsed entirely when the 
uprisings overthrew the rulers, thus paving the way for an “authority vacuum…with rivals 
competing violently to reconstruct state authority.”8 In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, by 
contrast, the state structure has largely prevailed in the face of the uprisings. Yet, the way the 
state as an organization is institutionalized considerably differs in both cases, which have had an 
underlying impact on the two countries’ trajectories of political transition.   
Raymond Hinnebusch, who has long written on state formation in Middle East and North 
Africa, offers the concept neo-patrimonialism to explain the variation in regime type in the 
MENA region. According to this concept, the state is constructed around “the relative balance 
between the two sources of authority” (namely personal and bureaucratic/institutional 
authorities).9 In Tunisia and Egypt (as opposed to Libya and Yemen), the state has never been a 
personal apparatus of the leaders in power. In contrast, the bureaucratic/institutional authority 
                                                          
8 Raymond Hinnebusch, “Introduction: understanding the consequences of the Arab uprisings – starting points and 
divergent trajectories,” Democratization 22 (2), 2015: 207. 
9 Hinnebusch (2015): 213. 
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has long enjoyed a relative autonomy of the leaders, which made it possible to “sacrifice the 
presidential family to save the state” in the face of the uprisings.10 For this reason, I think an 
analysis of the structure of bureaucratic/institutional apparatus would provide better insights 
into explaining the different trajectories of Tunisia and Egypt’s transitions. In this regard, it is 
pivotal to examine how security apparatus, or the military establishment, has historically 
positioned itself when it came to “intervene” in political affairs.   
As noted earlier, prominent scholars studying why authoritarianism is resilient in MENA 
often focus on “absence” of certain key elements in this region for democracy to emerge. 
According to this approach, in order to detect “what” the political systems in the MENA region 
“lack,” one should first begin by examining the trajectory of how western European democracies 
have emerged over time and then “idealize” it in detecting what the regimes in MENA are 
“missing.” However, as Bellin suggested, the absence of democratization in the region actually 
lies in the “strength of the state,” specifically “the state’s capacity to maintain a monopoly on the 
means of coercion.”11 
In general, the degree to which armed forces have played a role in a country’s 
independence process or taken the executive power through a military coup signals the feature of 
civil-military relations and the prospect of a political democracy in that country. The presence of 
a politicized military poses a major danger to the maintenance of democratic political 
institutions. Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans have indicated that “three out of every four 
failures of democracy are the result of a successful coup d’état,” the biggest threat to political 
                                                          
10 Hinnebusch (2015): 213. 
11 Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative  
Perspective,” Comparative Politics 36 (2), 2004: 143. 
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stability, especially in cases of democratic transitions following a regime breakdown.12 The 
concept of “the defense of the fatherland” plays a central role in the hands of military officers, 
who are so-called “above politics,” to legitimize their political autonomy, and even “without 
having to take over executive office.”13 However, being “above politics” does not guarantee that 
the military would step down entirely out of political sphere and a full-fledged civilian authority 
would emerge. On the contrary, the military establishment may still want to act as the “only” 
actor to determine whether, when, and how to “intervene” in the political realm.14 Even in the 
cases in which there is a working civilian authority, the military officers may not tolerate being 
confined to maintaining their messianic role (defending the fatherland); they might also want to 
be a part of setting and undertaking of the national goals, responsibilities that should only be 
assumed by civilian authorities.15  
Considering civil-military relations in its entirety, the important question that should be 
posed for the purpose of this study was how to maximize civilian control of armed forces. 
Samuel Huntington’s “solution” to civil-military “problematique” stipulates that civil authority 
needs to form a “professional/institutional” military that would be capable of confronting 
external threats, maintaining national sovereignty, and respecting legal civilian authority.16 
However, one should keep in mind that the establishment of “professional” military does not 
always ensure the “triumph” of civilian authority by itself. Brian Loveman discussed this 
possibility in great detail in his analysis of Latin American militaries, “[A]s the military 
institutions embarked on modernization and professionalization, they became still more 
                                                          
12 Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans, “Coups and Democracy,” British Journal of Political Science 44 (4), 2014: 
801, also cited in Brownlee et al. (2015): 190. 
13 Smith (2005): 73-77. 
14 Smith (2005): 75. 
15 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986): 32. 
16 Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed 
Forces (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999): 7. 
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politicized, more disdainful of civilian political parties and factions, more nationalistic, and more 
dependent on foreign doctrine, methods, and weapons [emphasis added].”17  
Establishing a civilian authority over the military was also a critical issue of third wave 
democracies in the 1980s and 1990s. In general, the institutional subordination of the military 
establishment to a democratic regime is sought after following a regime breakdown so that 
constitutionally “chosen” civilians would control and designate the military policy.18 Civilian 
authorities attempt to retain as much control as possible. So do the military officers. 
Subordinating the military establishment is usually problematic since the military officers would 
like to keep their institutional interests (not to mention their personal gains) “untouched” by 
emerging civilian authorities.19 In the light of such considerations, “contestation” between civil 
and military authorities occurs along two fronts as Stepan (1988) pointed out. The former 
demands to determine military policies, such as the definition of the military mission and the size 
of the military budget; in contrast, the latter wants to keep these prerogatives internally decided 
by the military establishment.20 
In the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, the armed forces sided with the protesters, thus leading 
to the overthrow of the incumbent rulers. In both cases, we have witnessed that the degree to 
which the military is institutionalized has played a critical role in the opening of democratic 
transition, in other words, the departure from authoritarian regime. However, the critical question 
that needs to be posed at this point is whether these militaries supported the mass uprisings 
because of their sincere commitment to democratic norms or because they calculated the 
                                                          
17 Brian Loveman, For La Patria (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1999): 59, as quoted in Smith (2005): 75. 
18 Smith (2005): 90. 
19 O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986): 34. 
20 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988), also cited in Smith (2005): 90. 
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outcome (regime breakdown) would better serve their interests. All aside, the biggest issue in 
terms of the maintaining of democratic transition in the aftermath of regime breakdowns is how 
to push the military out of political affairs, or if it is already out of politics, how to keep it so. By 
accepting depoliticized military as a catalyst of the maintenance of transition, we can better 
explain why some cases result in successful transitions and others do not. 
Considering how civil-military relations have played a role in the transitional processes in 
the case studies of this research, Tunisia and Egypt, it is important to note the political centrality 
of the military establishment. In retrospect, there has never been a military strongman in 
Tunisian history, unlike Egypt, where military officers have the ultimate control over civil 
politics by occupying the presidency post since 1952, including the post-Mubarak period.21 In 
comparison to Tunisia, the military has been well established and more central in Egypt’s 
political landscape over the years since the country’s independence (see Table 4.2).22 As Imad 
Harb wrote that “Throughout … periods of changing political roles, the Egyptian military 
remained the loyal repository of political power answerable only to a strong executive leadership 
in the person of a former military officer (the President) and sure of its privileged position within 
the polity.”23 Egypt’s strong military establishment has long benefitted from Egyptians’ fear of 
socio-political chaos as it has left them no other chance but to consent to “stability” over political 
plurality, a problematic precedent that dramatically presented itself again with the ouster of the 
                                                          
21 Alfred Stepan, “Tunisia’s Transition and the Twin Tolerations,” Journal of Democracy 23 (2), 2012: 96. 
22 In addition to being politically central, the military in Egypt is also the “engine of the industry” and the “supplier 
of public services.” Over the years, it has led projects in “land reclamation projects,” “public infrastructure,” and the 
“production of industrial and agricultural inputs like steel and fertilizer.” For more information on the military’s 
large industrial complex, see Shana Marshall, “The Egyptian Armed Forces and the Remaking of An Economic 
Empire,” Carnegie Middle East Center, 2015.  
23 Imad Harb, “The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?” Middle East Journal 57 (2), 
2003: 270, as quoted in Brownlee et al. (2015): 192. As regards the military’s role in defense industries, Harb notes 
that the military’s vast economic establishment makes at least 500 million dollars contribution to Egypt’s GDP 
every year as it employs about 100,000 people, see Harb (2003): 285; see also Taylor (2014): 121. 
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first civilian president in 2013.24 In contrast, though Tunisian military played a significant part in 
neutralizing the police forces and escorting President Ben Ali out of the country, it did not play 
any roles in determining “the key rules needed to make the democratic transition work.”25 Alfred 
Stepan and Juan J. Linz described the stance that Tunisian military held in the course of regime 
change as follows: “the army-a modest institution with few privileges to protect-pivoted to 
supporting the democratic transition rather than indulging Egyptian-style worries about how to 
safeguard its own power and perquisites.”26 Brownlee et al. (2015) wrote that the Tunisia’s chief 
of the armed forces, Rachid Ammar, acted in line with “values that were deeply ingrained within 
Tunisian military” when he sided with protesters who demanded the breakdown of Ben Ali 
regime. The values that have been established through long de-politicization “kept the Tunisian 
military from following in the footsteps of its Egyptian counterpart and inserting itself in the 
tussles between Islamists and their opponents, instead remaining a neutral bystander and 
allowing them to achieve a political settlement that has preserved Tunisian democracy.”27  
           
Table 4.2: The Centrality of Military in Egypt and Tunisia, Source: Updated data retrieved from World Bank Development Indicators, 2010-
2014; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2015; Bonn International Center for Conversion Global Militarization Index, 2015; 
Retrieved from Brownlee et al. (2015): 191. 
                                                          
24 Culbertson (2016): 250-253. 
25 Stepan (2012): 96. 
26 Stepan and Linz (2013): 29. 
27 Brownlee et al. (2015): 192-193. 
Measure Egypt Tunisia 
Size of Armed Forces  835,500 47,800 
Total Military Spending (millions of 
USD) 
5,477 980 
Military Spending as share of GDP 2.0% 1.3% 
Military Spending per capita 57.8 50.9 
Soldiers per 1,000 inhabitants 10.6 4.6 
Global Militarization Index Rank (152 
countries, 2015) 
26 77 
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 Different colonial experiences of both countries is possibly one explanation for the 
divergent practices of Tunisian military and its Egyptian equivalent in political affairs.28 French 
colonizers disassembled the Tunisian army and incorporated it into the French national military 
during colonial period from 1881 to 1956.29 Shortly after the independence, Tunisia’s first 
President Habib Bourguiba, a civilian politician, established the country’s national armed forces; 
however, he kept the military small so that it would not interfere in the political realm, a policy 
later inherited and carefully implemented by his successor Ben Ali.30 In contrast, Egypt had its 
own military establishment, albeit in a small scale, before the end of the British protectorate in 
the country, which had been preserved by and large after the independence.31 Since the Free 
Officers’ coup in 1952, the political power has been monopolized by the strong military officers, 
to the exclusion of nearly one year of a relative civilian rule during the transition. 
 In sum, an institutional analysis that considers the way in which the realms of civil and 
military authorities have been constructed in the MENA region provides explanatory insights 
into examining the prospects and perils of democratization in the post-Arab Spring process. As 
noted earlier, the presence of an institutionally dominant military within the state hierarchy 
(sometimes it might act like the state itself) may pave the way for democratic openings, 
especially during revolutionary regime-ousting moments. However, my argument here is in a 
significant part that the degree to which the military attempts to enlarge its institutional power at 
the expense of civilian authority during transitional processes determines whether these 
                                                          
28 Brownlee et al. (2015): 194. 
29 Richard Fogarty, Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-1918 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2008): 82, also cited in Brownlee et al. (2015): 194. 
30 The founding father of Tunisia, Bourguiba, believed that its small country could not afford to engage in an 
“arming race” with other regional actors; therefore, he invested more in his country’s economic and educational 
development rather than its defense (the country never allocated more than 2 percent of its GNP to defense), see 
Taylor (2014): 74; Jebnoun (2014); see also Zoltan Barany, “Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of The 
Military,” Journal of Democracy 22 (4), 2011: 31. 
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processes result in success. In the case of Egypt, with the breakdown of three decades-long 
Mubarak regime, the SCAF came into the position of the only central authority with the power 
that could supervise the transition that would primarily guarantee the institutional interests of the 
military. As a result, its tight oversight of the transition did not let a genuine power transfer to 
civilian government take place. Although it did not afford killing its citizens on the streets in 
2011, it did so in 2013 when military officers believed that civilian authorities began 
compromising their institutional prerogatives.32 In contrast, the Tunisian military has maintained 
its position of staying uninvolved in settling political matters even after the long-time autocrat 
was deposed, which has left civilian actors a political opportunity to work together for building 
the new Tunisia. 
4.1.2. Consensus Model of Politics: The Role of Conciliatory Pact-Making in Transition 
At the second level of analysis, one should examine consensus-seeking efforts among 
political elites for explaining the prospects and perils of transitional processes that unfolded in 
the wake of the Arab Spring. The consolidation of democratic transition requires more than 
merely the removal of the incumbent ruler; therefore, those who invest in the overthrow of the 
autocrat are expected to take a consensual stance aimed at building accountable institutions and 
implementing post-breakdown policies, going beyond their narrow agendas.33 One of the most 
challenging political considerations following a regime breakdown is pact-making. O’Donnell 
and Schmitter define pact as an “explicit agreement” among a group of actors which aims to 
establish rules overseeing the “exercise of power” by considering mutual interests of those 
agreeing upon it.34 Through a negotiated pact, actors rule out violent confrontation as a “way” to 
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resolve future disagreements; they instead make compromises by which they can convince each 
other. This conciliatory approach shared by all or at least the majority of the emergent political 
actors signals that they respect each other’s vital interests and that they deem political conditions 
of the emergent democratization process legitimate.35 Stepan and Linz argue that organized 
political groups should find or be provided a democratic platform in which they can discuss 
existing problems concerning the consolidation of democratic transition and how to build the 
future of the country. In this way, they can lessen fears or anxieties of other groups.36  
Rustow (1970) wrote that it is possible that a small number of actors, each having 
different ideological preferences on governance, can play a “disproportionate role” in 
establishing a broad-based agreement.37 In order for democratization process to continue, a group 
of actors engages in the decision-making process, mostly by negotiating with each other. 
Whitehead (2002) wrote that seemingly complicated bargains that take place among key 
“civilian” actors, either privately or publicly, determine the prospect of whether a pact (founding 
constitution), one that could encompass a wider society (by meeting their expectations) as well 
as that could democratize existing authoritarian order (including the remnants of the old regime), 
is reached.38 The best scenario for a power-sharing pact is attained when none of the social or 
political groups impose their “preferred project” on the other groups, all agreeing to their 
“second-best solution” that does not seem desirable in the first place.39 Through concessions and 
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bargains, political elites can find a common ground to resolve problems threatening the transition 
and to win over suspicions of the “other.” As observed in successful cases of transitions from 
authoritarian rule (e.g. Spain), actors know that they cannot do without each other since the rules 
of the “game” that govern the emergent transition following regime breakdown cannot be 
unilaterally imposed on other groups; therefore, they prefer negotiating each other to solely 
realizing their divergent agendas.40  
Scholars consider the “post-breakdown cooperation,” a substantial sign of “political 
maturity” among the actors that challenged and overthrew the existing regime, to be a significant 
factor in democratic transition.41 Tarek Masoud underscores the significance of post-breakdown 
cooperation by showing how rarely any kind of consensus among political actors is found in the 
MENA region. He suggests that the prevailing point of view entrenched in the regional political 
culture deems any political opposition “enemies to be silenced” instead of partners equally 
responsible for building effective and accountable political institutions. “Winner-takes-all” 
political mentality eliminates political opportunities aiming to develop a pluralist political 
platform that reconciles opposing ideologies in post-breakdown periods.42 Yet, the failure (or 
unwillingness) of revolutionary actors to make concessions (or work together) in the aim of 
securing the political transformation in the post-regime breakdown process cannot simply be 
explained by the region’s “exceptionalism.” It is more a global pattern that is possible to derail 
any transition under any regional circumstances. Giuseppe Di Palma’s remarks suggest a trans-
regional explanation, one that presents the mechanism behind this failure and also helps us go 
beyond the essentialist arguments such as “the region is of unique cultural characteristics 
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unfavorable to the development of democratic pluralism.” He aptly wrote, “players who are 
reluctant to trust an open political game, preferring instead to protect themselves against their 
adversaries by girding democracy with their own invasive measures, may end up with a troubled 
democracy or worse.”43  
With regard to Tunisia and Egypt, the politics of compromise explains, to a significant 
extent, the divergence in the transitional outcomes in both countries. Stepan and Linz noted that 
competing political factions (primarily seculars and Islamists) were having joint meetings to find 
out “whether they could reduce mutual fears and agree upon rules for democratic governance” as 
early as eight years before the uprisings in Tunisia while a sound political dialogue could not 
develop up until four months after the regime breakdown in Egypt.44 Unlike Egypt, Tunisia’s 
democratization experiment was successful since (apart from other reasons) the political actors 
(Islamists and secularists) responsible for overseeing the transition acted in accordance with the 
understanding that “compromise was essential to their own future political prospects.”45 Eva 
Bellin wrote that there was a complete dedication to democratization process among Tunisian 
political elites in terms of “breaking with” the old regime (and its remnants) and “embracing free 
and fair elections.”46 On the other hand, in Egypt, as Brown aptly wrote, “Morsi and the 
Brotherhood made almost every conceivable mistake…They alienated potential allies, ignored 
rising discontent, focus more on consolidating their rule than on using the tools that they did 
have, and used rhetoric that was tone deaf at best and threatening at worst.”47  
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45 Mark Freeman and Seth Kaplan, “Common Ground, Common Good: Tunisia’s Model for Bridging Political and 
Social Divides,” Christian Science Monitor, March 17, as quoted in Brownlee et al. (2015): 188. 
46 Eva Bellin, “Drivers of Democracy: Lessons from Tunisia.” Middle East Brief (75), August 2013: 3.  
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Opposing actors’ sincere commitment to dialogue has been one of the underlying aspects 
of Tunisia’s transitional experience. O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) mentioned a paradox that 
usually faces the revolutionary elites (especially those who underwent years of repression) 
during the transition: “where and when it is easier to bury the past.”48 Burying the past and 
sitting on a negotiation table with the ones responsible for “past actions of oppression” is often 
challenging and may be unacceptable since the memories are usually vivid, especially in the 
minds of those who might seek “revenge” if given opportunity.49 Yet, Ghannouchi and his close 
friends stayed away from revenge-seeking discourses and practices; they instead preferred to 
convince those possible “revenge-seekers” among Islamist groups to give up their anger and to 
“consent” to work with their rivals in order to restore peace and stability in the country, which 
had a significant influence over the consolidation of the transition. It is similar to Nelson 
Mandela’s efforts to bring peace to South Africa. As Noah Feldman wrote about Mandela in 
2013 right after he died, “He brought peace through his ability to convince millions of his 
countrymen that they should accept much less than they were in justice owed [emphasis 
added].”50 By contrast, Islamists in Egypt showed little interest in finding a mutually acceptable 
“rules of the game” with their rivals. The non-Islamist demands and concerns were driven out of 
the transitional process, largely because Islamists did not see any reason to work with their rivals 
while they already had the military’s political support. A related reason was that Islamists did not 
believe that their political rivals were able to create a unified and strong political bloc against 
their governance. Eventually, the socio-political tension became evident and the divide between 
Islamists and non-Islamists further escalated by the beginning of 2013 as the latter began to see 
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the former as “hijackers” of the revolution.51 In such an atmosphere, the opposition groups 
initiated the campaign “Tamarrud,” or “Rebel,” that called an old “arbiter” (the military) for 
“taking back” the revolution from the Islamist government, which resulted in the military coup 
and marked the failure of democratic transition in Egypt. 
Moreover, long-standing institutional legacies in a given country substantially influence 
the prospect of “pact-making” process during democratic transitions. Daniel Brumberg examined 
Egypt and Tunisia by focusing on how the presence of a strong military legacy has affected the 
pact-making period in both cases. As noted earlier, Egypt’s military has historically been well 
organized and highly politicized. For this reason, it was not affected by the collapse of the 
Mubarak regime. Political actors with differing ideologies opted to separately negotiate with the 
military in order to maximize their particular political ends and alienate the other political 
factions from the pact-making process in Egypt. In the case of Tunisia, where there has not been 
a historically muscular and politically autonomous military, Brumberg suggests, the opposing 
political actors “had to either fight or negotiate,” thus paving the way for the achievement of a 
pluralist pact-making process.52 
In terms of pact-making or power-sharing practices through which at least two opposing 
rivals settle the issues during a democratization process, the political actors in the Arab world 
have generally proven unsuccessful. However, significant lessons can be drawn from the post-
Arab Spring process as divergent trajectories of compromise-making efforts have emerged in the 
countries whose long-time authoritarian presidents were ousted. In Egypt, the Islamist alliance 
(the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists), which won more than 70 percent of the total seats in the 
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parliament, did not feel “obliged” to adopt an inclusive stance towards non-Islamists during the 
transition. As Brumberg wrote, Islamists in Egypt demonstrated “no sudden readiness to offer 
‘credible assurances’ to their non-Islamist rivals;” therefore, “the chances for a consensus-based 
draft constitution – and indeed for accommodation in general – appeared slim.”53 On the 
contrary, Tunisian political elites have reaffirmed that tackling multidimensional political 
problems that a country in transition faces cannot be take place through the concentration of 
power in the hands of the majority but the distribution of it among political rivals. To borrow 
from Volpi and Stein (2015), the political actors (especially the Ennahdha party) made 
ideological concessions by believing that “losses today can be compensated by gains in the 
future,”54 which consolidated the belief in a democratic system. Holding two legislative elections 
in 2011 and 2014, in which political power successfully alternated between opposing political 
groups without any incidents, reaffirmed the success of Tunisia’s “story.” Political challenges 
introduced by periodic setbacks have been overcome through a consensual understanding in all 
sincerity, proving vital in the consolidation of Tunisia’s democratic transition. 
4.1.3. Moderation of Islamist Parties 
The relatively pluralist atmosphere that emerged in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab 
Uprisings paved the way for the rise of Islamist parties, political outsiders that had long been 
driven out of the their countries’ political center by either “founding fathers” or their more 
authoritarian successors. One of the underlying factors that determined the success or failure of 
transitional processes in the Arab Spring countries is Islamist parties' sudden and unexpected 
“move” to (or, “capture” of) the political center or “establishment.” Islamist parties have an 
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undoubted capacity to mobilize a large number of people in their respective societies; thus, these 
parties’ participation in a pluralist political landscape is vital for the prospect of democratization. 
However, how they deal with the give-and-take nature of a meaningful pluralist system is largely 
determined by the degree to which they moderate their ideological agenda. There is a rich 
scholarly literature on the positive relationship between the ideological moderation (in general, 
this moderation process occurs gradually) of Islamist parties and democratization process of the 
country in which they operate. With regard to democratic transition literature, political elites who 
are ideologically rivals but strive to find a “common ground” throughout the transition process 
and its aftermath are considered moderates.55 By moderation of ideological agenda, I refer here 
to a gradual movement from radical to a moderate standpoint at which liberal notions of 
democracy and individual human rights as well as political tolerance and pluralism are respected 
and absorbed by the religious parties.56 Wickham (2004) explained:  
Ideological moderation refers to the abandonment, postponement, or revision of radical goals that 
enables an opposition movement to accommodate itself to the give and take of “normal” 
competitive politics. It entails a shift toward substantive commitment to democratic principles, 
including the peaceful alternation of power, ideological and political pluralism, and citizenship 
rights.57 
A word should be said about the leadership within Islamist parties and its roles in terms 
of persuading the rest of the party members about the gradual moderation of ideological 
standpoints held earlier within the party. Schwedler (2011) noted that leadership is important but 
insufficient by itself for the moderation of party ideology since it also requires “the process of 
engaging in debates about ideological commitments…that can produce ideological moderation 
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[emphasis in original].”58 Post-Arab Spring political developments have demonstrated both 
domestic and international observers how important the longtime inter-party debates within 
Islamist parties, the ones that have trimmed radical components of their ideological standpoints, 
have been in generating a pluralist atmosphere in which major policy discussions could be 
multilaterally undertaken. 
 Asef Bayat (2013) makes his contribution to discussions about the moderation of Islamist 
parties within the context of his conceptualization of Post-Islamism. Bayat notes that there are 
certain indications that religious politics in Middle East and North Africa has long been 
undergoing an ideological transformation, as he calls “the metamorphosis of Islamism (in ideas, 
approaches, and practices) from within and without.”59 By Islamists, Bayat refers to religious 
ideologies or movements whose main goal is to establish an Islamic state in which sharia law 
defines everyday life, a “normative and legal perspective” underscoring individual obligations 
rather than rights.60 Traditional Islamist motivations such as “capturing and Islamizing the state 
and society,” which swiftly surrounded regional politics shortly after the Iranian Revolution in 
1979, Bayat points out, had begun to lose ground in the region in the aftermath of September 11, 
2011.  Religious politics encountered serious confrontations from not only non-Islamists but also 
“conservatives” who “felt the deep scars Islamists’ disregard for human rights, tolerance, and 
pluralism had left on the body politic and religious life.”61 Thus, legitimacy crisis that “Islamist” 
politics has still been undergoing has paved the way for a “new” religious politics that both 
emphasize conservative sensibilities in society and embraces democratic norms and values.62 
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Bayat’s post-Islamism moves beyond the old Islamist politics both by underlining people’s rights 
(instead of only focusing on their obligations), seeing people as equal citizens rather than mere 
subjects, and by prioritizing a secular/civil state at the same time promoting a pious societal 
framework.63 
 Bayat’s argument echoes across Volpi and Stein’s (2015) article on different Islamic 
trends, in that they offer a distinction between “statist” and “non-statist” Islamism to help 
understand how the gradual ideological change within Islamist parties (namely, those they 
consider “statist”) over time can contribute to further democratization of the state.64 Volpi and 
Stein’s description of “statist” Islamism underscores the interconnected relationship between 
“national structure of governance” and “strategies” of Islamist groups that wish not to dominate 
political landscape (in a “one vote and one time” fashion) but participate in a pluralist political 
community through legal means (elections). It is those Islamists, Volpi and Stein suggests, that 
have achieved to “come closest to reconciling Islamic doctrines…with liberal forms of 
democracy.”65 In contrast, non-statist Islamist trend follows a “proselytizing” path that aims to 
establish an Islamic society through grassroots activism. This current, which prioritizes religious 
community over democratic policy-making across the nationwide, tends to fail to forge a 
conciliatory approach towards its “others” at the socio-political stage, as it refrains from 
compromising its vision of “an ideal society inspired by teachings and practices from the time of 
the prophet.”66  
Volpi and Stein’s conceptualization of non-statist Islamist may need further elaboration, 
as it only puts emphasis on Salafist and jihadi movements, each being of infra-political structure. 
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Building on their argument, it is also important to consider movements or parties that play the 
rules of “democratic game” until they get elected. After that, they might feel “unshackled” to put 
their “Islamization of the society” project into action, by either gradual restoration of the society 
(usually takes a long time) or “sudden” transformation of political and social realm (usually 
departs from democratic values and norms). Ultimately, neither is linked to a democratic future, 
as both image an “ideal” future in which political realm is not designed through a pluralistic but 
majoritarian fashion that ignores political expectations of different segments of the society, 
which would eventually result in the installation of another form of authoritarianism. 
As regards the two successful cases of regime breakdown, that is, Tunisia and Egypt, the 
Islamists won the first democratic elections in their countries following the regime breakdown 
due to their capacity to mobilize their grassroots networks in the absence of other opposition 
forces that had long been repressed by authoritarian regimes. However, the transitional 
performances of the Islamist parties in both countries represent the two opposite edges of a 
spectrum. While the Islamists (or “post-Islamists” within the frame of Bayat’s argument) 
achieved some success in building an accountable and politically pluralist system in Tunisia, 
their Egyptian counterparts failed to generate a democratic national consensus that would have 
addressed the socio-political demands of large segments of society. The question to ask: what is 
the reason that Tunisian Islamists, namely the Ennahdha party, have helped the “new” Tunisia 
oversee a comparatively smooth democratization process, albeit its periodic setbacks, while 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood could not channel its political power into establishing a democratic 
“new” Egypt?   
It is important to note here that what the Arab Spring uncovered is not simply a 
resurgence of “Islamist” politics that has long aimed to establish an Islamic order, but rather a 
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new religious politics that has evolved into a path in which religion plays a social role within a 
civil and secular state.67 However, the question Ellen McLarney asks “Why Arab Spring made 
life better in Tunisia, failed everywhere else”68 is an important one since this “metamorphosis” 
of Islamism did not occur somewhere else, but Tunisia.  
Tunisia’s Ennahdha has contributed to the restoration of democratic institutions and 
practices in the post-Ben Ali era by not taking advantage of its electoral success and overseeing 
the transitional process without “listening to” others’ concerns and expectations. However, the 
party has reached its current ideological evolution that respects democratic norms and values as a 
result of “35 years of constant self-evaluation and more than two years of intense introspection 
and discussion at the grass-roots level,”69 Rached Ghannouchi explains. The political message of 
the party was more anti-systemic and non-conciliatory in the 1970s when it was first founded 
under the Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami (the Islamic Tendency Movement, MTI) as an actor that 
aimed to re-establish Islam as a dominant factor in Tunisian society, an alternative national 
project to the founding father Bourguiba’s top-down secularization.70 However, over the years of 
repression and struggle for survival under Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes (to the exclusion of a 
short period of political opening in the late 1980s), the reformist figures such as Ghannouchi and 
former prime minister Hamadi Jebali have pioneered political reconciliation, thus redefining the 
party’s ideological stance as one that aims to develop a “Tunisian Islam compatible with 
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democratic principles.”71 This ideological transformation can also be observed in the party’s 
experience at working with other parties even though they do not see eye to eye on every issue. 
In 2005, Ennahdha joined 18 October movement with other secular parties in opposition to 
protest Ben Ali regime.72 This was an important move for rival ideologies to understand each 
other’s concerns and expectations by “sitting on the same table,” eventually compelling each 
actor to moderate their party agenda to “keep their place” on the table. 
The 2011 Arab Spring provided Tunisia’s Ennahdha an opportunity to show its sincere 
commitment to pluralist democracy although they were not the main actor that instigated the 
uprisings. Having considered the fragility of the country’s transitional process, Ennahdha 
prioritized compromise and reconciliation instead of alienation and polarization to make a clear 
break from old regime practices. The party’s 2011 electoral program considered the state a 
“political civil entity” which “oversees public matters, protects social peace, works for economic 
development, respects individual and public liberties, upholds democratic practices, and ensures 
equality between citizens in rights and in obligations.”73 Ghannouchi recalls his party’s political 
stance in the aftermath of Tunisia’s first democratic election held on October 23, 2011: 
Once we won the elections, our Party was the first to call for national unity and avoiding 
monopolization of power, calling for co-existence and cooperation between secularists and 
Islamists. The Troika coalition between Ennahdha and two secular parties was a clear proof of our 
conviction that Tunisia can only be governed through consensus, and that transitions cannot be 
managed by the logic of majority versus minority.74 
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The drafting process of the country’s new constitution was one of the manifestations of 
Ennahdha’s momentous role in the transition. The party avoided any moves that its rivals might 
interpret as the political disenfranchisement of large groups within the society75, which would 
have undermined the prospect for democratization. By setting partisan interests aside, the party 
preferred to soften its ideological claims in a “democratizing” manner whose best indicator was 
to avoid the imposition of Islamic law on the society. Ghannouchi later explained his party’s 
disinterest in any types of hegemonic social engineering which Tunisia’s old rulers were fond of, 
“Ennahdha does not want Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s top-down approach of imposing their 
ideology and strategy on the Tunisian people.”76  
Moreover, the party accepted key secular articles in the new constitution although it 
pioneered principles that the party had previously contradicted. Despite the internal pressure 
from local members who demanded the party should push for leaving a large Islamic imprint on 
the new constitution (especially on the issue of the imposition of Islamic law), the Ennahdha 
leadership engaged in serious discussions with “rank-and-file” party members to obtain their 
approval of the accepted “secular” articles that contradicted the party’s original standpoint.77 
Undoubtedly, Ghannouchi’s charismatic authority in the eyes of the members helped his liberal 
interpretation of Islam easily resonate across the party. He explained his approach: 
It is not suitable that Islamists and Muslims in general fear that freedom would harm Islam. The 
greatest danger to Islam would be the absence of freedoms and the unavailability of sufficient 
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guarantees for the freedom of conscience, the freedom of expression, the freedom of belief, the 
freedom of movement, and all social freedoms.78 
It would be misleading to assume that the party’s new position is actually temporary or 
tactical just to soothe the fears of non-Islamists while maintaining a “secret” goal of Islamization 
of the society on the backstage. Instead, the party’s conciliatory moves to bring as many political 
actors as possible into the transitional period (e.g. Ghannouchi’s efforts to repeal exclusion law) 
to create a broadly-represented political platform enabled the transition to proceed, albeit its 
perils. Instead of introducing a new form of authoritarian governance, Islamists of Tunisia 
strived to contribute to the consolidation of the post-Ben Ali democratic gains.79 Furthermore, 
the party’s transformation from being a “religious” movement to a broad-based party has 
continued since it lost 2014 parliamentary and 2015 presidential elections to the center-right 
Nidaa Tounes. Briefly, Tunisia’s Ennahdha has succeeded to position itself at the center of the 
Tunisian ideological political scale, as its reformist leader Ghannouchi had long hoped. Volpi 
and Stein (2015) writes, “Rather than seeking to have an immediate impact on the state 
institutions and state governance, statist Islamists in Tunisia have prioritized becoming an 
entrenched, mainstream party with a say in public and political life regardless of whether they 
are in opposition or in government.”80 The 10th party congress held on May 20, 2016 was 
momentous in this respect as critical organizational decisions were made. The party announced 
plans to change membership procedure to “recruit new voices and perspectives.”81 Most 
strikingly, leading party members are prohibited from preaching in mosques as well as holding a 
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leadership position in civil society groups, including religious or charitable organizations. 
According to this new vision, the party separated its political activities from religious, social, and 
educational pursuits in order to focus on policy-making to address everyday expectations of 
Tunisians. Ghannouchi explained his party’s new perspective: 
We seek to create solutions to the day-to-day problems that Tunisians face …it is no longer 
necessary for Ennahda (or any other party) to struggle for religious freedoms: under the new 
constitution, all Tunisians enjoy the same rights, whether they are believers, agnostics, or atheists. 
The separation of religion and politics will prevent officials from using faith-based appeals to 
manipulate the public.82 
In contrast, transitional process took a very different path in Egypt because not only the 
military and judiciary paralyzed the process but also the Muslim Brotherhood’s leadership 
oversaw the country’s transition in a majoritarian or “one vote-one time” understanding, leaving 
only limited political space to opposition actors. Egypt’s politics had long been deprived of 
multiparty and electoral politics in the hands of authoritarian leaders. This status-quo continued 
even after the country’s first seemingly democratic elections. Islamists (the Muslim Brotherhood 
and Salafis) garnered a considerable public support; however, in contrast to Tunisia’s Islamists, 
they failed (or did not see any reason) to channel this support into pact-making while drafting the 
new constitution.83 The question to ask: what prevented the Muslim Brotherhood leadership from 
mirroring a path similar to the one taken by Ennahdha? Aside from institutional challenges to the 
transition posed by two antiquated old regime actors (military establishment and judiciary), how 
did the MB’s lack of ideological moderation by itself lead to the downfall of the first democratic 
initiative in Egypt? 
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The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna as a conservative 
movement. Populist rhetoric and avoidance of violent actions swiftly earned the movement a 
wide social and political appeal. Since its beginning, the leading party members preferred to 
adopt a reformist (instead of “revolutionary”) ideology so as to avoid political exclusion and 
repression. Over the years, they did refrain from directly challenging the regime, assuming that 
this would help the movement’s survival in the long run. Yet, this non-confrontational and 
accommodative relation with the regime had caused two essential problems: First, since it did 
not need to bargain or deal with other political actors in opposition, it failed to develop 
conciliatory and give-and-take strategies.84 It instead preferred less risky/more advantageous 
channels such as the military and the Interior Ministry to stay in political scene.85 Second, since 
it had not engaged in deal-making “pacts” with opposition actors, mostly seculars and liberals, it 
had become almost impossible for Islamists to understand other actors’ expectations, viewpoints, 
and concerns. In addition, since the survival had always been the key issue for the movement, the 
concerns such as “how to solve Egypt’s problems” had never occupied the leading figures’ 
agenda, which prevented them from knowing “what is outside a conservative and pious life.”86 In 
comparison, Tunisia’s Islamists and secular actors in opposition had already entered into 
agreements as early as 2003 and built a broader understanding on many issues such as gender 
equality and democratic civil system (that rejects installation of Shari’a Council87) by the time 
the uprisings broke out in late 2010. 
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In comparison to Tunisia’s Ennahdha, the Muslim Brothers had not entirely resolved the 
ideological quandary the movement had long been facing at the time the Arab Uprisings spilled 
over Egypt in 2011. Historically, internal debates between the traditionalists and the young 
reformists dominated the movement’s agenda. While the “old guards” had pioneered the 
ambiguous and long-standing motto “Islam is (the) Solution,” the reformist figures such as Abdel 
Monem Aboul-Fotouh had been pushing for moderate interpretation of Islamic principles as well 
as embrace of democratic norms.88 However, by the mid-1990s, the former group began to 
dominate the movement’s decision-making process, which led key reformist figures such as Abu 
al-Ala Madi and Isam Sultan to leave the movement and form their own political party, the 
Wasat (Center) Party.89 
Old guards’ domination within the movement had continued between 2001 and 2011. 
Two key figures, Mahmud Izzat (Secretary General until 2008) and Khayrat al-Shatir (Deputy 
General Guide) stood out and began reformulating the movement’s organizational structure as 
they established a new and more monolithic power center (dependent on a small group of 
individuals) that determined where the Brotherhood ideologically stood.90 The Shura Council 
and the Guidance Bureau, two highest institutions within the movement, were reshaped as their 
members were no longer selected on the basis of individual merits or skills but loyalty or 
subservience to the leadership.91 In this regard, one can point to the similarity between Egypt’s 
Brotherhood and Tunisia’s Ennahdha in terms of the leadership domination within them, 
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somehow equating Ghannouchi’s leadership with his counterparts’ in Egypt. Even if reasonable, 
this argument would overlook fact that Ghannouchi’s moderate approach embracing the 
principles of democracy has enabled his party to move beyond (this process is still ongoing) its 
earliest ideological blindness (which aimed to establish a religious state), whereas his 
counterparts in Egypt chose an exclusionary path against reformist and moderate figures within 
the Brotherhood. Thus, neither a bottom-up nor a top-down ideological transformation that could 
have given rise to Islamism’s “metamorphosis” took place in Egypt. 
By the time the Arab Spring broke out in Egypt, MB’s internal ideological cleavages 
reappeared. In the face of revolutionary objections and fast-changing social atmosphere, the 
movement’s gradualist and conservative character became one of the main problems to 
overcome, as some figures such as Saad al-Husseini and Mahmoud Ezzat (two senior members 
of the Guidance Bureau) began talking about “preparing society for Islamic rule” and 
“reinstating the implementation of the huddud punishment.”92 Shortly after the breakdown of 
Mubarak’s regime, the Brotherhood leadership reconsidered their earlier policy of not to form a 
political party. In February 2011, Muhammad Badi, the movement’s Supreme Guide, appointed 
Muhammad Sa’ad al-Qatatni for overseeing the process of establishing the new party, as 
announced later “a civil party with an Islamic frame of reference.”93 However, reformist voices 
were initially silenced when the movement leadership announced in March that all the members 
must join the new party, leading some reformist figures such as Ibrahim Zaafarani and later 
Muhammad Habib to resign from the movement.94 
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As the post-Mubarak process proceeded, the question of how the Brotherhood, as a civil 
actor with the most established social network, would respond to the calls for democracy, 
transparency, and political opening that the uprisings unfolded was yet to be answered. In 
comparison to Tunisia case, where Islamists sought to deal with those with whom they marched 
against Ben Ali’s autocracy, the Brotherhood preferred to work with old regime actors 
(especially military), Salafis, and jihadi groups, while at the same time alienating other groups 
such as leftists, seculars, and liberals (major actors that instigated the uprisings).95 The rationale 
here was that an alliance with Salafi parties such as the Nour Party and jihadi parties such as the 
Building and Development Party instead of young revolutionary groups (non-Islamists) would 
not necessitate the Brotherhood to reconfigure its ideological position. Moreover, the 
Brotherhood deemed a “temporary pact” with the military establishment more feasible since, in 
this way, it would not have to play democracy’s “give-and-take game” with “hesitant” civilian 
actors who are worried about “Islamization of their revolution.” 
Ultimately, we may ask: Did the Muslim Brotherhood support the democratic transition 
as an end by itself or did the movement deem the political vacuum left by Mubarak’s ouster an 
“opportunity” to realize the establishment of a political system based on God’s will rather than 
Egyptians’? Wickham (2011) has noted that the principles – such as internal unity, obedience to 
the leadership without questioning, and discipline – that enabled the movement to survive 
decades of repression and exclusion turned out to be obstacles for organizational transformation 
and ideological reform, which posed serious problems to the maintenance of the transitional 
process in Egypt.96  
                                                          
95 Al-Anani (2015): 535. 
96 Wickham (2011): 221. 
107 
 
4.1.4. Civil Society Activism 
Scholars of democratization often focus on the give-and-take calculations between elites 
during a pact-making process and the institutional framework97 of a collapsed or collapsing 
regime. It is largely because these factors tend to determine whether a transition from 
authoritarian rule would proceed. However, as noted in Chapter I, the role that civil society plays 
is noteworthy not necessarily in the initiation of democratization but more in the consolidation of 
it. The presence of a mobilized civil society does not guarantee democracy by itself, as evidently 
witnessed in Europe during the inter-war period.98 Additionally, civil society activism 
demanding democratic opening (through occasional protests or nationwide union strikes) might 
lead authoritarian rulers to resort to further undemocratic instruments against the society.99 Yet, 
once authoritarian regime collapses, a tradition of relatively strong civic activism in that country 
might put pressure on actors who oversee the transitional period.100  
Civil society as a term is often defined as “a sphere of unrestrained activism of groups 
and associations of all sorts, free from intervention of the state.”101 Just because of this necessity 
for “restrained” state, civil society has been usually considered an essential component of a full-
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fledged democracy. Along the same line, Larry Diamond in his analysis of the relationship 
between civil society and democracy distinguishes political elites from the public when he 
suggests the former plays a vital role in bringing to an end the authoritarian rule and overseeing 
the country to democratization. Yet, he adds that the elites are in need of a relatively strong civil 
society while consolidating the transition. He notes that “multiple avenues” are crucial “for ‘the 
people’ to express their interests and preferences, to influence policy, and to scrutinize and check 
the exercise of state power.”102 
Yet, it should be emphasized again here that democratization processes are complex and, 
more importantly, context-dependent (social and political). Indeed, in the Western world, civil 
society has usually been the triggering mechanism behind political liberalization moments. In 
contrast, in non-Western contexts, non-democratic leaders usually create a political realm 
guarded by their security apparatuses (either military or police forces plus intelligence or a 
different variance of these three), which has historically been most evident in the Middle East 
and North Africa politics. Thus, even in the cases where there is a relatively independent civil 
activism, the regimes are well equipped with tools to crush any anti-regime civil mobilizations 
before they are initiated. Because of this, we need to expand the focus of civil society to “rapid 
protest movements” that directly target the regime and collapse it down through a “sudden civic 
activism,” an activism we have observed in the case of Arab Spring.  
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s define this rapid social mobilization as “resurrection of civil 
society.” For them, civil society might manifest itself in several “explosive” ways during the 
transition from authoritarian rule: sometimes by the resurgence of formerly closed political 
parties or the creation of new ones to push for a more genuine democratization, the resurgence of 
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grass-roots organizations demanding political opening, or the transformation of trade unions or 
universities into bulwarks of expression of ideals, interests, and anger at the regime.103  
Associational activism is said to be “school of democracy.”104 However, as noted earlier, 
in cases where regime’s survival is fundamentally dependent on its tight control over and the 
loyalty of coercive apparatus (as largely seen in the MENA countries), the presence of civil 
society culture in a country (high rates of individual memberships in voluntary associations may 
be an indicator) does not guarantee by itself the initiation of democratization. It can play a 
constructive role when the transition is set off.105 Considering post-regime breakdown processes, 
some argue that societies with experience of participating in organized activities are more 
capable of channeling this participatory experience into other forms of political involvement 
such as voting or joining a political party, thus having positive impacts on maintaining 
democratic transition. In contrast, societies with almost no history of associational activism (as 
an indicator of civic culture) have a relatively lower chance to consolidate democratization 
process.106 With that in mind, the divergence between Tunisia and Egypt in their transitional 
outcomes can in part be explained by the differences between the two countries’ civil society 
framework. Table 4.3 below demonstrates the self-reported rates of present and past membership 
in different types associations in Tunisian and Egyptian societies. Across all types of 
organizations, Tunisians show higher enthusiasm in being a part of associational activism than 
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their Egyptians equivalents, which may be attributable to the former society’s relative success in 
exercising political pressure on elites who have overseen the transition.107 
Type of Organization Tunisia Egypt 
Church or religious 1.2 0.8 
Sport or recreational 5.5 0.3 
Artistic, musical, or education 3.9 0.3 
Labor Union 1.9 0.3 
Political Party 1.7 1.3 
Environmental 0.8 0.3 
Professional association  1.8 0.4 
Humanitarian or charitable 1.0 0.5 
Consumer 0.4 N/A 
Self-help, mutual aid 0.4 0.3 
Other 0.1 N/A 
Table 4.3: Self-Reported Rates of (Present and Past) Organizational Membership in Tunisia and Egypt Compared (2013), Original Source: 
World Values Survey 6th Wave; Retrieved from Brownlee et al. (2015): 205. 
Relative political pluralism in Tunisia’s transition might be attributable to the 
heterogeneity in the country’s civil society. After the Ben Ali regime broke down, Islamists 
could mobilize their grassroots in the electoral process; yet, civil society in Tunisia has never 
consisted of only Islamists, but instead “a mixture of religious, non-religious, and labor-based 
groups.” Brownlee et al. (2015) wrote that this heterogeneity “meant that political contestants 
from across the political spectrum possessed significant resources for mobilizing voters into the 
country’s first democratic elections.”108 Bellin (2013) noted that civil society played a “watchdog 
function” in the course of Tunisia’s democratization process by “keeping the track of the 
regime’s performance and holding its feet to the fire when it strays too far from democratic and 
liberal ideals.”109 Indeed, there have been other “red lines,” which did not necessarily stem from 
religious concerns, to which the certain segments of the society are sensitive. For instance, when 
the first draft of Tunisia’s new constitution was released on August 8, 2012, Article 28, which 
defined women as men’s “partners” or “complements” within the family, sparked large protests 
(organized by feminist groups) in downtown Tunis to call the drafting body for reformulating the 
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wording of the article.110 By contrast, Egypt’s civil society was largely constructed around 
religious “sensitivities” and was dominated by the Islamist communal activism, through either 
mosques or other religiously oriented associations.111 For this reason, Islamists parties (in 
contrast to their secular counterparts) found a more advantageous atmosphere in which they 
could easily mobilize voters in the wake of the first election. Soon after the Islamists’ domination 
in the society was “complemented” by their accession to political power in 2012, secular groups 
began more openly expressing their concerns about “Islamization” of the revolution. Aside from 
the fiery debates about whether shari’a should be included in the new constitution, the non-
Islamist opposition believed that Egypt’s new social and political landscape became increasingly 
more Islamized and majoritarian, which led the majority of them to turn against the Muslim 
Brotherhood when the military officers decided to overthrow the first democratically elected 
president.  
Furthermore, the two countries’ history of labor unions and the role that these unions 
have (or have not) played in their respective countries’ democratization after the uprisings might 
help to understand, to a certain extent, the two opposite directions into which these countries’ 
transitions have evolved. In Tunisia, the country’s major labor union, the UGTT (Union 
Générale Tunisienne du Travail), was established in 1946, a decade before the country’s 
independence. The union played a critical role in Tunisia’s independence process by assisting 
Habib Bourguiba’s anti-colonial movement; for this reason, it succeeded to establish an 
autonomous space for itself independent of the regime’s oversight.112 Over the years of political 
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cooperation with and confrontation (more commonly) against the regime, the UGTT maintained 
its organizational autonomy, at both leadership and local levels, while at the same time it grew its 
public image of resistance to the political authority.113 Furthermore, the union’s democratic 
structure provided local branches with a certain level of independence from the top leadership, 
which enabled them to act autonomously at times when the latter supported the regime’s policies 
unfavorable to labor rights.114 In the post-Ben Ali period, the UGTT has played an important 
mediating role between political actors in the country in order to keep the transition on track. 
During politically contentious periods in 2013, when two political figures were assassinated and 
the Ennahdha government had become the focal point of criticism, the UGTT attempted to 
initiate the national dialogue meetings by which main political parties could resolve their 
disagreements. In order to eliminate the political impasse, the UGTT proposed a roadmap to the 
political actors that included the resignation of the Prime Minister Ali Larayedh and the 
formation a more consensual government.115 In contrast, there never exists an “independent” 
labor union that would challenge the regime’s policies in Egypt. The leading labor union in 
Egypt, the ETUF (The Egyptian Trade Union Federation), was formed in 1957 as a regime-
initiative to bring labor activism under control.116 In general, the state-dominated economy under 
President Gamal Abdul Nasser had given no credible authority to labor unions so that they would 
have negotiated labor’s demands with the regime. They were instead awarded economic benefits 
for their political quiescence.117 The ETUF could never win the “rank-and-file” workers’ consent 
because the union was largely seen as a state apparatus unwilling to defend labor rights. In the 
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January 2011 uprisings, the union again sided with the regime, attempting to convince workers 
not to participate in the protests. Since the rank-and-file workers had already lost confidence in 
the ETUF leadership due to the regime’s longtime co-opting preeminence over the union, the 
workers organized their own anti-regime demonstrations autonomously of the union.118 Yet, the 
lack of leadership prevented the workers from speaking as a “unified working class” that would 
have put a meaningful pressure on the transitional actors.119 In the post-Mubarak transitional 
period, the labor unions have become the “targets of political contestation rather than drivers of 
reform;”120 in other words, they have been seen by political elites as “political areas” to be 
“captured” to control labor affairs. In sum, the labor unions in Egypt could not play a similar 
bridging role that their Tunisian counterparts could in the transition.  
In conclusion, despite being a secondary variable, the embedded conditions of civil 
society activism in both countries played a considerable part in their transitional paths in the 
aftermath of the uprisings. The autocrats of Tunisia and Egypt, who had stood at the helm of 
their countries’ political power for decades preceding the Arab Spring, could preserve their 
political interests without being challenged by civil society. The coercive apparatus of their 
regimes enabled the autocrats to narrow the realm of political and civil liberties. Yet, in 2011, 
when the Arab Spring allowed revolutionary actors to begin a transition process towards a 
democratic political system, the civil society actors such as labor unions found an opportunity 
(unlikely in the past because of coercive authority of the regimes) to be a catalyst in this political 
transformation. Tunisia in the post-Arab Spring period has witnessed the significance of civil 
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society activism for the maintenance of the country’s transition. In 2013, when the country’s 
transition process was about to breakdown in the face of political assassinations as well as 
unresolved economic problems, civil society actors created an opportunity for dialogue by 
bringing revolutionary elites to the same table, thus pushing each side (mostly the Islamists) for 
further compromises. In this way, Tunisian elites could overcome the political impasse and 
preserve the transition process.  
In examining the major dynamics that led to the collapse of Egypt’s transitional process 
in 2013, civil society might not be considered one of those dynamics at the first glance. Yet, an 
emphasis on it might still provide important insights. Since the independence (up until 2011), the 
military-oriented actors had had the sole authority to design the political realm in Egypt and civil 
society actors could never challenge this status-quo. At the time when Mubarak’s regime broke 
down in the face of social uprisings, there was not a strong civil society actor equivalent to 
Tunisia’s UGTT. As a result, the transition process turned into a mere bargain over the country’s 
future between two emergent actors (only one of them was civilian: Muslim Brotherhood). 
Egypt’s transitional experience demonstrated that socio-economic tensions might lead to serious 
countrywide confrontations against the autocrat and even collapse the political authority (as 
witnessed in 2011 and 2013); yet, the public’s anger at the incumbents is not sufficient by itself 
to build a functioning democratic system. During the transition process, civil society 
organizations could not put pressure on Egypt’s post-Mubarak political actors (the military and 
the MB) to compel them to make a genuine departure from the old regime. Moreover, the 
pluralistic coalition - among liberal, Islamist, and leftist groups - that emerged on the eve of 2011 
uprisings soon fell apart in the months following the overthrow of Mubarak. Thus, having felt no 
civil society pressure, the military and the MB governed the transition by seeking to maximize 
115 
 
their own power to the exclusion of the other, which resulted in the failure of the democratic 
transition process in Egypt.  
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CONCLUSION 
 The Arab Spring had sweeping political impacts over the Middle East and North Africa 
politics. Four longtime autocrats were removed from their posts and two others secured their 
positions through violent and bloody measures taken by security forces against citizens. In 
general, it was expected to introduce democratic governance across the region, where the 
prospect of democratic rule had long seemed unlikely (due to the region’s alleged socio-cultural 
“baggages”) in comparison to other regions. Yet, the establishment of a form of democratic rule 
has failed in “successful” regime breakdown cases, except Tunisia. In the case of Egypt, where 
the longtime autocrat was ousted and the first democratic elections were held, transitional actors 
did fail to establish a functioning and relatively accountable political system. As I have argued, 
the divergence in these two countries’ transitional directions can be explained within the 
parameters of particular context-dependent variables (not necessarily attributable to other 
regions’ transitional experiences).  
 One is related to the state formation, in other words, the institutional pillar(s) on which 
the state as an organization is structured or established. In this study, I argued that the greater the 
role the state’s chief coercive apparatus (namely, the military) play in a country’s independence, 
the more autonomous its institutional position will be, therefore the bigger the space it will 
occupy in that country’s political affairs. There is a significant difference between Tunisia and 
Egypt in this regard. Since its independence, a civilian autocrat had stood at the helm of the 
political power center in Tunisia, without leaving any institutional and political autonomy to the 
military establishment (by which it could have intervened in political realm). Marina Ottaway 
wrote, “A transition from an authoritarian to a democratic system involves a redistribution of 
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power, thus, a break in the status quo.”1 In the case of Tunisia, the overthrow of Ben Ali, 
Tunisia’s Louis XIV, gave rise to such a break, which created a “power vacuum no single actor 
could fill.”2 Therefore, the revolutionary actors felt obliged to engage in dialogue to replace this 
“collapsed” power center with a more inclusionary one. By contrast, the disposition of Hosni 
Mubarak did not lead to such a political power vacuum in Egypt, where the military 
establishment has long been a strong political force independent of the presidents. Even through 
Mubarak’s rule collapsed in 2011, the embedded mechanisms and political forces of his regime 
prevailed, which complicated the parameters of the transition in Egypt. 
The second pivotal variable to explain the difference in the transitional outcomes in the 
cases of Tunisia and Egypt is the revolutionary elites’ readiness to give up or compromise their 
ideological stances. In Tunisia, the constitution-writing process occurred in the shadow of 
debates about whether Islamic principles would be included in the new constitution. Having won 
the country’s first democratic election 2011, Ennahdha grassroots expected to see an “Islamic 
imprint” on the new constitution. Yet, the party leaders, especially Rachid Ghannouchi, were 
aware that they could not ignore the demands and concerns of the other political groups by 
imposing an “agenda” in a top-down fashion, a longtime practice of which they had long accused 
the old regime. Compromise among political elites became the new “normal” in Tunisia after the 
sudden overthrow of the Ben Ali regime. In the transition process, the political actors, whether 
Ennahdha or Nidaa Tounes or labor unions, acted in an understanding that establishing a new 
political system (expected to be a democratic one) was a too heavy burden for a single group or 
party to carry. In this regard, the domination of the political realm in a single-handed manner has 
                                                          
1 Marina Ottaway, “Democratic Transitions and the Problem of Power,” Wilson Center: Occasional Paper Series, 
Spring 2014: 3. 
2 Ottaway (2014): 3. 
118 
 
never been an issue, since the political actors knew that they must listen to the political 
expectations of the larger society. For example, under the shadow of violent terrorist attacks and 
political assassinations that brought the country to the edge of chaos throughout 2013, Ennahdha 
willingly stepped down and handed the political power to a technocrat government (through the 
mediation of the UGTT) that could finalize the writing of the new constitution and oversee the 
country to new parliamentary elections, a move that helped to maintain the country’s transition 
process.  In contrast, there never existed a political pluralism in Egypt after the uprisings. Unlike 
in Tunisia, where the political forces have been aware from the beginning of the transition of the 
fact that they cannot ignore one another, there was only one politically strong civil organization 
in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, the organization did not feel “obliged” to share its 
political power with other political groups and to pay attention to other groups’ concerns during 
the constitution-making process. It instead sought to launch a battle (when it deemed necessary 
to restore its political authority) against politicized state institutions, military and judiciary, and 
lost; a situation that moved Egypt from Mubarak’s semi-authoritarianism to Sisi’s full 
authoritarianism.3  
The overthrow of longtime autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt created an electoral 
opportunity for politically repressed religious movements (Ennahdha and Muslim Brotherhood) 
in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Given their mobilization capacity within the society, they 
won their countries’ first democratic elections. However, the way they oversaw the transitional 
process during their short tenure significantly differed from each other. This is partly because 
their approaches towards what a democratic political system means are different. Ennahdha 
leaders believed that they must work with their rivals. They gave up some of their ideological 
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standpoints (such as gender issues and sharia’s inclusion to the constitution) during the 
transition. In essence, Ennahdha’s transitional compromises represent the manifestation of 
longtime interparty debates. The reformist figures within the party (such as Rachid Ghannouchi 
and Hamadi Jebali) had pioneered principles compatible with a democratic system. This led to 
the metamorphosis of political Islam in Tunisia, which trimmed some of the sharp edges of 
Ennahdha’s ideological standpoint.  
By contrast, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood did not undergo such a moderation process. 
Reformists barely had a say within the movement, which forced many of them to leave the 
organization much earlier than the Arab Spring broke out. The problem for the Muslim 
Brotherhood leadership was that they believed that their electoral success granted them political 
legitimacy by which they could rule the country in a majoritarian fashion. Islamists did not heed 
the concerns and expectations of non-Islamist groups, those who saw socio-political issues from 
a secular standpoint. They instead struck an alliance with the remnant of the old regime (the 
military), which seemed ideologically (among other reasons) instrumental at the time, given that 
it would not force them to compromise their ideological “pillars.” Instead of turning the 
movement into a mainstream political actor (as in the Tunisia case), which would have created a 
pluralist atmosphere to address expectations of all Egyptians, the MB’s old figures preferred to 
instrumentalize the transitional process in favor of their narrow agenda. “Brotherization” of the 
society became the major question in Egypt’s emergent political landscape, as the country’s 
political arena witnessed a more polarized society than the one before the uprisings began. 
Eventually, when the unprecedented alliance between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military 
broke down in July 2013, the former could not find any non-Islamist groups on its side to jointly 
push back the military intervention.  
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I consider civil society activism a secondary (in comparison to the first three) but still 
significant variable in explaining the divergent transitional trajectories of Tunisia and Egypt. In 
the literature of democracy or democratic transition, civil society is one of the “taken-for-
granted” indicators that demonstrate the prospect of democratic governance in a polity. Yet, 
empirical evidences suggest that regional or context-dependent characteristics should be taken 
into a careful consideration. The way civil society operates under heavy-handed autocrats in 
MENA, specifically its capacity to put pressure on political actors, significantly differs from the 
way it functions in Europe. It is commonplace that civil society is a catalyst (or a check-and-
balance mechanism) in Europe in pushing political power holders for more liberalization. 
Nevertheless, it is often less effective against authoritarian rulers in MENA, since the autocrats 
of MENA have long maintained their regimes by limiting civil and political liberties, usually 
with a strong security apparatus under their control. Thus, even when there is a relatively strong 
civil society, it does not automatically lead to a democratic opening under authoritarian regimes. 
Yet, once the regime collapses and the process of democratic transition is set off, civil society (if 
strong enough) might play a constructive part in forcing revolutionary elites to make a more 
genuine break from the old regime as well as creating alternative platforms calling these elites to 
negotiate and resolve their disputes. This is the reason why I consider this variable secondary. 
 Considering the cases of Tunisia and Egypt, the longtime autocrats (Ben Ali and 
Mubarak, respectively) did not step down because civil society put a lot of pressure on their 
regimes, but because the military officers did not support them at the time. In the case of Tunisia, 
a long history of authoritarian rule had made a democratic opening impossible in the country up 
until the Arab Spring, though the country had already possessed social conditions favorable to 
democratic development. The relative autonomy that the civil society organizations, including 
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the country’s major labor union (UGTT), possessed did not pave the way for civil and political 
liberalization under decades-old authoritarian regime. However, once Ben Ali stepped down in 
2011, the country’s pre-existing strength of civil society began to be a catalyst of the political 
change. In the summer of 2013, when the country was on the verge of civil war due to political 
assassinations and significant increase in terror attacks, the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet, 
which included four major civil society organizations in the country, played a mediator role in 
bringing political rivals (especially the Islamists and the seculars) to the negotiation table. The 
Quartet helped revolutionary elites from a wide political spectrum to reach consensual solutions 
to the problems that confronted the transition process at the time. Later in 2015, the Quartet was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its constructive efforts during the transition. In Egypt, by 
contrast, even though the rapid mobilization of civil society groups (such as the Kefaya and the 
April 6) led to the collapse of the Mubarak regime, they were unable to play any role (similar to 
their Tunisian equivalents) during the transition. It is mainly because the state’s coercive 
apparatus (the military) was still in power and did not want any challengers to its authority. The 
scenario was not different for the labor unions. Historically, the workers had seen them as “trojan 
horses” that generally prioritized the regime’s interests over the labors’. Therefore, they had no 
significant check-and-balance power against the regime, which continued during the transition 
process. They mostly became “spheres” that the post-Mubarak political actors aimed to capture 
to seize control over large segments of the working class rather than “forces” that would help 
advance democratic development.  
By focusing on the post-Arab Spring transitional trajectories, the present study aimed to 
understand how a longtime-authoritarian political system transitions to a democratic form. With 
its major attention focused on the aftermath of the revolutions, I have tried to identify the key 
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factors that determined why only Tunisia (out of two successful regime breakdown cases) was 
able to establish a functioning and pluralist political system, while Egypt entirely failed in 2013. 
Yet, the Arab Spring is still a recent history, which is one of the two possible shortcomings of 
this research. After six years, even though Tunisia’s transitional achievements appear 
considerable today, the country still has a long way to go in consolidating a full-fledged 
democracy. The second shortcoming of this research is that I did not examine the regional/global 
politics aspect of the transitional processes in both countries. I instead sought to structure this 
study around domestic variables that were shown to significantly influence either the transition 
to a democratic governance or the restoration of a new form of authoritarianism. Further research 
is needed to evaluate the impact of external rather than internal variables per se in determining 
the divergent outcomes of these two countries’ transitions.  
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